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PRETEXTUAL FOURTH 
AMENDMENT ACTIVITY: ANOTHER 
VIEWPOINT 
James B. Haddad* 
Pretextual detentions, arrests, and searches pose knotty 
fourth amendment problems. With an air of plausibility, defense 
attorneys often accuse police of pretextual use of arrest war-
rants, search warrants, and various exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. Specifically, they contend that officers have utilized a 
particular fourth amendment doctrine to obtain certain evidence 
even though courts have not assigned as a reason for approving 
the doctrine the need to discover such evidence. 
Through the 1970's leading commentators offered no unified 
analysis of pretext issues. Professor Wayne LaFave's impressive 
1978 treatise touched upon pretext problems in each of its three 
volumes but provided no analytical framework for viewing com-
mon issues pertinent to discussions scattered over several places 
in the treatise.1 Earlier, in his powerful Holmes Lectures at the 
University of Minnesota, Professor Anthony Amsterdam defined 
the pretext issue with brilliant conciseness and described alter-
native solutions. 2 After a too brief discussion, however, he re-
jected a solution that is popular with many reviewing courts and 
that, years later, after more extended analysis, Professor John 
Burkoff would endorse. Amsterdam instead proposed in a few 
contexts a response that I do not believe he would advocate in 
other contexts where he envisions that police engage in pretex-
tual fourth amendment activity. 3 
Within the last six years, however, LaFave and Burkoff have 
devoted deserved attention to pretext problems, spurred by lan-
guage in Scott v. United States;' where, ironically, the defense 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., 1964, University of Notre Dame; 
J.D., 1967, Northwestern University; LL.M., 1969, Northwestern University. 
1. LaFave himself cites ten different sections in the 1978 treatise touching upon pre-
text and related fourth amendment problems. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § l.2(g), at 19 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as 
LAFAVE Supp.]. 
2. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 433-
39 (1974). 
3. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
4. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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raised no cry of "sham." Updating his treatise, LaFave provided 
a unified analysis and proposed a new solution.~ Burkoff offered 
a thorough discussion in several articles, culminating in the 
thoughtful piece that appeared in the valuable fourth amend-
ment symposium issue of the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform. 6 
Burkoff's writings have rekindled my interest in the topic. 
Years ago I wrote a short response to Professor Amsterdam's 
brief argument in support of his partial solution to the pretext 
problem.7 Now I write in reaction to Professor Burkoff's sugges-
tions. Along the way, I briefly comment upon LaFave's alterna-
tive, reserving further discussion until I understand more fully 
how LaFave's proposal would function. 
I disagree fundamentally with Burkoff's position. I reject his 
contention that the United States Supreme Court long has uti-
lized the approach that Burkoff favors. Unlike lower courts, it 
never adopted such an approach. I believe Burkoff is wrong 
when he claims that the present Court, if the approach in 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez8 prevails, will have aban-
doned all efforts to curb pretextual fourth amendment activity. 
Rather, it will only have rejected Burkoff's proposed solution. 
The Supreme Court has consistently utilized an approach that 
in 1977 I described as the "least undesirable alternative."9 If my 
enthusiasm for that approach is still tempered, it is because I 
withhold judgment until I better understand LaFave's new sug-
gestions and not because Professor Burkoff's arguments have 
persuaded me. Nevertheless, like others interested in the pretext 
issue, I owe Professor Burkoff thanks for directing substantial 
attention, long overdue, to troublesome questions posed by 
pretextual fourth amendment activity. 
5. See LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 19-34. 
6. See Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of 
an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151, 181-90 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine]; Burkoff, Pretext Searches, 9 
SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches]; Burkoff, The Pretext Search 
Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine]. 
7. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable 
Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 204-14 (1977). 
8. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
9. See Haddad, supra note 7, at 213. 
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I. THE PRETEXT lssuE: WHAT IT Is AND WHAT IT Is NoT 
A. Divergence Between Judicial Reasons for Approving a 
Fourth Amendment Power and an Officer's Reasons for Using 
that Power on a Particular Occasion 
Professor Burkoff sees a pretext problem when an officer 
searches "for reasons that do not constitute a proper legal justi-
fication for the search. "lo Professor Amsterdam summarizes the 
concern: 
A power is claimed by a law enforcement officer to en-
gage in conduct that intrudes upon the privacy of a citi-
zen . . . . The allowance of that power consistently with 
the fourth amendment is sought to be justified by the ex-
istence of a specific law enforcement need . . . . The 
power may in fact be exercised for some other purpose 
than one which is asserted to justify it. 11 
Justice Rehnquist has spoken of situations where "the officer 
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the 
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's ac-
tion. "12 All these formulations suggest that the pretext issue 
arises when there is divergence between an officer's reasons for 
using a specific fourth amendment power on a particular occa-
sion and the reasons advanced by courts for approving the doc-
trine which allows such fourth amendment activity. 
An alleged misuse of the inventory search doctrine illustrates 
the issue. As with all exceptions to the search warrant require-
ment, the inventory search exception is supported by legitimate 
governmental objectives said to outweigh the individual's inter-
est in being free from the type of search in question. According 
to the Supreme Court, inventory searches are reasonable be-
cause they serve three needs. First, they help preserve property 
that comes into police custody. Second, they assist the police in 
combating false claims of police misappropriation of the citizen's 
possessions. Finally, they prevent dangers that the property 
10. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 101. 
11. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 434. 
12. United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). Rehnquist was not focusing on 
the specific pretext search issue but on the generic question of whether an officer's state 
of mind, as distinguished from his conduct, should sometimes require a determination 
that the officer violated the fourth amendment. See infra notes 157-69 and accompany-
ing text. 
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could pose to the custodians' health or safety.13 Nonetheless, a 
police officer might inventory a citizen's automobile or briefcase 
for illegitimate reasons. The officer might be uncommonly 
"nosy." He or she might wish to harass the individual because of 
intense personal dislike arising out of the officer's encounter 
with the individual. Alternatively, the officer might harbor a bias 
against persons of the age, race, or sex of the owner. Finally, the 
officer might inventory the property in the hope of discovering 
evidence of a crime. 
The exception to the warrant requirement for searches inci-
dent to arrest also demonstrates the pretext problem. The 
search incident to arrest exception seeks to protect the officer 
and to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence of the 
crime for which the officer arrested the suspect.14 An officer who 
searches a traffic arrestee in the hope of discovering evidence of 
a burglary has engaged in a pretext search, as has the officer who 
merely desires to humiliate the arrestee. 
In addition to warrantless search exceptions, courts have con-
stitutionally approved other police conduct that gives rise to 
pretextual fourth amendment activity. Subject to certain pre-
conditions and limitations, the police can, for example, upon 
reasonable suspicion detain an individual for brief, on-the-street 
questioning.111 They can arrest him upon probable cause, some-
times without a warrant, sometimes only under the authority of 
an arrest warrant.16 They can execute a search warrant issued in 
compliance with probable cause and specificity requirements of 
the second clause of the fourth amendment. Courts consider 
these powers reasonable because, when exercised within the de-
fined limits and subject to preconditions, they believe these 
powers serve valid governmental purposes that outweigh an indi-
vidual's interest in being free from the particular type of 
intrusion. 
The police could use any power for the wrong reason. An of-
ficer might curb a vehicle in order to meet its physically attrac-
tive driver. An officer might execute a traffic arrest warrant at a 
suspect's home to gain an opportunity to question the suspect 
about a murder, to obtain a vantage point for making plain view 
observations of possible evidence of the murder, or to acquire 
13. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976). 
14. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
16. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 
411 (1976). 
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such evidence in a search of the arrestee's person or of the area 
within the arrestee's reach at the time of the arrest. Similarly, 
an officer might obtain and execute a valid search warrant com-
manding the seizure of marijuana, hoping to come across evi-
dence of an armed robbery while thoroughly searching the prem-
ises named in the marijuana warrant. 
B. Operating Within the Boundaries of Warrantless Search 
Exceptions and of Other Legal Limitations Upon Fourth 
Amendment Activities 
As used in the literature, a pretextual arrest is in issue only if 
the officer acts within the legal boundaries of a fourth amend-
ment doctrine. Suppose a police officer arrests a burglary sus-
pect on a disorderly conduct charge where no probable cause ex-
ists even as to disorderly conduct. If a court finds no probable 
cause, then it need not reach a claim of pretext. Similarly, a 
pretextual use of a warrantless search exception is not in issue 
unless the officer has satisfied the preconditions and acted 
within the limits of a recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement. If the officer searches the trunk of a car on the open 
highway at the place where he or she has stopped it, but 
searches nowhere else in the vehicle and does nothing to safe-
guard its contents, the officer simply has not engaged in an in-
ventory search. Thus the prosecutor should lose in efforts to 
support the search on an inventory theory even without the de-
fense raising a claim of sham. 
It is important, however, to understand how warrantless 
search exceptions operate. Contrary to what Justice Frankfurter 
might have envisioned, today a prosecutor, to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of a search, need not contend that on the occa-
sion in question the police officer was confronted with the par-
ticular law enforcement need that gave rise to the particular 
warrantless search exception.17 To invoke the moving vehicle ex-
ception, for example, the prosecutor need not demonstrate that 
the officer actually was faced with the prospect that a delay to 
17. Although a firm supporter of the warrant requirement, Frankfurter, unlike Su-
preme Court Justices of more recent vintage, did not translate this preference into the 
notion that there were a few fixed exceptions to the warrant requirement, within the 
boundaries of which warrantless searches are per se permissible. To Frankfurter a war-
rantless search was unlawful if, on the particular facts, officers were not confronted with 
a legitimate need to act without taking the time to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rubinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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obtain a warrant might have prevented seizure of the evidence.18 
Similarly, to justify a search incident to arrest, the prosecutor 
need not prove that the officer feared for his or her safety or 
searched in order to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence.19 Professor Burkoff ignores this point when he chas-
tises Justice Rehnquist for citing United States v. Robinson20 
in the discussion of pretext claims. He also ignores the point 
elsewhere in his article. 21 He contends that a prosecutor who 
would def end what he or she knows was pretextual fourth 
amendment activity must falsely assert that an officer acted for 
a reason that served to legitimatize the warrantless search ex-
ception. 22 While that might be a rote response to a claim of 
sham, alternatively the prosecutor can argue that the police can 
use a particular warrantless search exception even if the ration-
ale for the exception would not appear applicable to the case at 
hand. This is what rejection of case-by-case adjudication, in 
cases like Robinson, in favor of generalized doctrines is suppos-
edly all about. The importance of this point will become appar-
ent when I discuss Professor Burkoff's solution to the pretext 
problem.23 
C. Claims of Pretext in The Trial Courts: When Does 
Defense Counsel Raise the Issue? 
To judge from reported decisions, defense lawyers pursue 
claims of pretext only to assert that the police have used a 
fourth amendment power motivated by a desire to obtain in-
criminating evidence. Counsel do not argue before reviewing 
courts that the fourth amendment requires relief when the of-
ficer has acted because of other improper motives. In fourth 
amendment pretext cases, other such motives appear irrelevant: 
the officer's desire to meet the attractive driver who violated the 
speeding law; his personal disdain for the smart aleck rich kid 
18. See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 
(1982); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). 
19. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
20. Id. 
21. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 75 n.22. 
22. Professor Burkoff repeatedly suggests that a prosecutor engages in unethical be-
havior when he or she urges a court to admit evidence that has been obtained through 
pretextual fourth amendment activity, arguing that the prosecutor is using deceit under 
such circumstances. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 536-37 n.60. 
See also id. at 524, 534, 540 n.79. 
23. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
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whose car the officer inventoried after arresting the youth on a 
curfew violation; an officer's prejudice against Blacks or Hispan-
ics or Poles. 
Practical reasons may explain defense lawyers' failure to make 
fourth amendment claims in the latter situations. Perhaps they 
cannot prove that on an individual occasion the officer's con-
duct-within the letter of the law-was racially motivated. Per-
haps they see no cognizable legal theory arising from an officer's 
personal dislike for an individual citizen. Suppression of evi-
dence is the most obvious fourth amendment remedy when an 
officer acts from an improper motive. It is unavailable when the 
officer's fourth amendment activity yields no evidence. Perhaps 
officers who stop, detain, arrest, frisk, or search in the hope of 
obtaining incriminating evidence find such evidence more fre-
quently than do officers who engage in such fourth amendment 
activity because of fluttering hearts, personal spite, or racial big-
otry. Nevertheless, with support from the opinions of Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Rehnquist, I find it ironic that the only 
"bad" motive that defense counsel urge as worthy of condemna-
tion under the fourth amendment is the officer's desire to obtain 
criminal evidence. 2• Normally we would expect praise for the of-
ficer who, while acting within the letter of the law, pursued this 
motive. 
I will return to this point later, but now I make one additional 
observation about when counsel urge fourth amendment pretext 
claims. Recall that, to be lawful, a police officer's use of a war-
rantless search exception need not be affirmatively motivated on 
a particular occasion by the reasons that led a court to approve 
that particular exception.211 Posit a situation where an officer, 
acting constitutionally, rather mindlessly searches a traffic ar-
restee. He might think traffic arrest searches are silly, but he 
learned such behavior from fellow officers and knows it meets 
departmental and judicial approval. If the defense counsel con-
cedes that the officer's conduct was not caused by a desire to 
gather incriminating evidence, or if he can offer no proof of such 
24. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 245 (1960) (Douglas, J. dissenting), Doug-
las said that it made no sense to assert that an officer acts in "bad faith" when he seeks 
to manipulate fourth amendment powers so as to obtain criminal evidence. Although 
Douglas disliked both the term "bad faith" and the "bad faith" rationale for excluding 
evidence obtained through a pretext search, his Abel dissent is the only United States 
Supreme Court opinion in which a Justice adopts an approach to pretextual searches of 
the type endorsed by Professor Burkoff. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
Concerning the views of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, see infra notes 170-91 and 
accompanying text. 
25. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
646 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:3 
motive, defense counsel will make no pretext claim. In other 
words, he or she will urge condemnation of the officer who uses a 
fourth amendment power in order to gather incriminating evi-
dence, but not the officer who uses the same power for no partic-
ular reason at all. 
D. Distinguishing Pretext Issues from Other Analytically 
Related Issues 
In the supplement to his treatise, Professor LaFave groups the 
pretext issue with several other issues and fact situations, all of 
which he analyzes with an eye to deterring fourth amendment 
violations.26 For example, an officer might act within the letter 
of the fourth amendment, while being willing to engage in im-
proper conduct if necessary to obtain incriminating evidence. 
Because such conduct is unnecessary, the officer might not carry 
out this intent. Alternatively, an officer might knowingly engage 
in certain conduct incorrectly believing that such conduct is ille-
gal, when in fact such conduct is legal. Or he might act in the 
mistaken belief that certain facts exist (or do not exist), where, 
if his belief were true, his conduct would be illegal. Or he might 
engage in conduct incorrectly believing that one legal theory 
could support the actions when, in fact, another theory would. 
Professor Burkoff has joined Professor LaFave in thoughtful 
discussion of several of the issues that these situations raise.27 
He has, however, correctly warned against confusing these inter-
esting issues with pretext issues. 28 Cases posing the former is-
sues, like cases that concern whether the officer acted within the 
letter of the law, may yield dictum that bears upon the pretext 
issue, particularly from the viewpoint of scholars who, like 
LaFave and Burkoff, wish to resolve related fourth amendment 
problems within a unified, internally consistent framework. Nev-
ertheless, in reviewing judicial responses to claims of pretext, we 
must not confuse cases posing such claims with cases that raise 
no such issue. 
26. See LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § l.2(g), at 19-28. 
27. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 81-100. 
28. Id. at 82-84. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO CLAIMS OF 
PRETEXT 
In 1974 Professor Amsterdam outlined three possible re-
sponses to claims of pretext. 29 In 1977 I supplied a terminology 
for identifying these approaches: (1) the Use-Exclusion Ap-
proach; (2) the Ulterior Purpose or Bad Motive Approach; and 
(3) the Hard-Choice Approach.30 In providing an overview ade-
quate to embrace Professor LaFave's recent contributions, I 
would now use the term "Case-by-Case Analysis" to denote the 
second category. I identify Professor Amsterdam with the first 
response; Professor Burkoff, some lower courts, and Professor 
LaFave with differing branches of the second approach; and the 
United States Supreme Court, consistently through history, es-
pecially Justice Brennan and, more recently, Justice Rehnquist, 
with the third approach. 31 I remain a supporter of the third ap-
proach, at least until I have a fuller understanding of how Pro-
fessor LaFave's suggested solution would function. 
A. The Use-Exclusion Approach 
· Professor Amsterdam proposed that we remove the incentive 
for police to use fourth amendment powers32 for an improper 
purpose. If, for example, we believe that the need to protect 
property, deter false claims of theft, and ward off dangers out-
weigh the individual's privacy interest, we might permit inven-
29. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 436-39. In their recent efforts to present a unified 
analysis of the use of pretextual fourth amendment activity as a means of gathering 
criminal evidence, Burkoff and LaFave both ignore this portion of Amsterdam's Holmes 
Lectures. They view as his solution to the problem the administrative-regulation ap-
proach which he endorsed elsewhere in the lectures. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doc-
trine, supra note 6, at note 22 and accompanying text; LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 
1.2(g), at 54 n.152. The administrative-regulations approach is designed to narrow discre-
tion, which, in turn, would narrow the opportunity for pretextual fourth amendment 
conduct, as would any narrowing of fourth amendment powers. See infra notes 48-52 
and accompanying text. When he specifically addressed pretext problems, however, Am-
sterdam specifically endorsed what I call the "use-exclusion approach." Amsterdam, 
supra note 2. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. Amsterdam urged his ad-
ministrative-regulation approach as a cure for discretion exercised based upon such mat-
ters as a citizen's skin color or manner of dress. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 415-16. 
30. Haddad, supra note 7, at 206-14. 
31. See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text. 
32. I recognize that the fourth amendment sets limits and does not grant authority. 
Nevertheless, I use "fourth amendment powers" to denote searches and seizures that 
courts deem reasonable because authorities utilized a warrant or acted within a recog-
nized exception to the warrant requirement. 
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tory searches but prohibit a prosecutor from using at trial any 
evidence derived from an inventory search. 33 Under the same 
approach, if we deem searches of traffic arrestees proper to pro-
tect police officers and to prevent concealment or destruction of 
traffic offense evidence, we would allow such searches without a 
showing that such reasons had applicability in the case at hand. 
A prosecutor, however, could use as evidence nothing that 
turned up except the proper objects of such a search: a weapon 
or evidence of the traffic offense for which the police officer 
made the arrest. 
Professor Amsterdam apparently proposed use-exclusion only 
as a means of deterring misuse of those fourth amendment doc-
trines that he disliked to begin with, as, for example, inventory 
searches or license check stops. 34 He did not claim, for instance, 
that whenever an officer made a valid traffic stop, a court should 
exclude his or her subsequent plain view observations of evi-
dence of a more serious crime. This was so even though police 
could use traffic stops in the hope of making plain view observa-
tions of evidence of a more serious offense. In more narrow con-
texts, Professors James B. White36 and Wayne LaFave36 in 1974 
also proposed that courts should allow police to engage in cer-
tain searches but should exclude at a criminal trial evidence be-
yond the courts' rationale for such searches. 
Because of the deserved reputation of its supporters, the use-
exclusion proposal merits serious discussion in any full treat-
33. Amsterdam used stop and frisk rather than inventory search as his prime exam-
ple. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 437-38. I use the inventory search doctrine because it 
provides an easier vehicle for explaining the individual motivation e.pproach. 
34. Id. at 433-39. See Haddad, supra note 7, at 209 & n.89. 
35. See White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study 
of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 209-14. White argued that the sole 
rationale for a search incident to arrest is the need to safeguard the officer from attack. 
In so doing he completely and astonishingly ignored Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969), and the bpinions of Justice Frankfurter cited therein, which speak of the need to 
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. Starting with his faulty premise, 
White concluded that courts should exclude as evidence any item found in a search inci-
dent to arrest other than a weapon. Id. at 210-14. Thus, I assume, under White's theory, 
if an officer discovered the fruits of a burglary in a search incident to a burglary arrest, 
the trial court would exclude such evidence. Although White's erroneous premise led to a 
preposterous conclusion, he is still to be credited with recognizing the possibility of using 
use-exclusion as a means of eliminating the incentive for pretextual fourth amendment 
activity. 
36. See LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": 
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 156-57. There LaFave suggested that 
use-exclusion might be used in the case of searches incident to traffic arrests. If such 
searches yielded a weapon or evidence of the traffic violation, the court would receive 
such evidence. It would exclude all other evidence found in a search incident to a traffic 
arrest. 
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ment of pretext issues. Curiously, in their efforts to establish a 
comprehensive approach, neither Professor Burkoff nor Profes-
sor LaFave has commented upon the proposal. In 1977 I criti-
cized this approach for reasons that justify only a footnote here 
in the absence of any new commentary in recent years. 37 Courts 
have not adopted this approach even though, in some cases, it 
makes as much sense as the more popular approach described in 
the next subsection. 38 
B. Case-by-Case Adjudication 
Under a second approach courts examine pretext claims on a 
case-by-case basis, excluding the product of the fourth amend-
ment activity if they find that officers exercised the power 
pretextually. Courts and commentators ordinarily understand 
this approach to require the predominant motivation for police 
conduct to lie within the purported, constitutional purpose, al-
though Professor Burkoff would not invoke an exclusionary rem-
edy except where the sole motive was an improper one, a point 
that I discuss below. 39 
Many lower courts have adopted this motivation approach. 40 
Consider this example. A narcotics officer desires to get into a 
narcotic suspect's home. The officer either lacks probable cause 
or does not wish to expend time and effort to obtain a search 
warrant. The officer learns that there is an outstanding traffic 
37. See Haddad, supra note 7, at 206-10. In summary: 
My opposition rests on several grounds. First, the "costs" of such an approach, 
while depending upon chance, would inevitably be so enormous as to be intolera-
ble, partly because of derivative evidence consequences. Second, in departing 
from present exclusionary philosophy by attenuating the relationship between 
misconduct and exclusion, the use-exclusion approach would breed disrespect 
for the judiciary and would not survive a brief experimental life. Third, I am 
convinced that use-exclusion is such a radical approach that even a zealous ad-
vocate would employ the method sparingly. Such an advocate would use it only 
to combat sham use of those fourth amendment powers which he would gladly 
see eliminated altogether. He would not propose use-exclusion to curb sham use 
of fourth amendment doctrines which he believes are legitimate on their face. 
Thus, like the rest of us, he would be required to turn elsewhere for a solution to 
the problem of fourth amendment sham. 
Id. at 207. 
38. I have found no recent decision adopting the use exclusion approach, although it 
is possible that a few exist. Cf. Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C. 1971) 
(decided several years before Amsterdam recommended the use-exclusion approach). 
39. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
40. Holdings or dicta approving such an approach can be found in many of the cases 
cited in Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 113 n.213. See also LAFAVE Supp., 
supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 51-54. 
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warrant for the suspect. The officer goes to the suspect's resi-
dence when he or she has reason to believe that the suspect is at 
home. The officer enters with the intent to arrest, but predomi-
nantly motivated by a desire to find narcotics in plain view or 
within the scope of a search incident to arrest. Finding that the 
officer entered with this motive, and noting that a legitimate 
purpose of a traffic arrest warrant is not to aid in the discovery 
of narcotics, the court suppresses the evidence.41 
Professor LaFave's recent formulation also would analyze pre-
text claims on a case-by-case basis. His inquiry, however, is not 
whether the police motive was improper but whether the police 
departed from standard procedures.42 Unlike Professor Burkoff, 
I do not discuss LaFave's approach at length because I am not 
sure how it would operate.43 If, in the hypothetical, the officer 
completes the steps necessary to bring the suspect to court to 
answer the traffic charge, would Professor LaFave allow the use 
of the narcotics discovered in a search of the arrestee's person? 
Is it only necessary that the narcotics detective do what any 
other officer could do in executing a traffic arrest warrant? Or 
under LaFave's test is the seizure bad because normally narcot-
ics detectives do not execute traffic arrest warrants (even though 
they undoubtedly have the power and probably exercise it on 
some occasions where no suggestion of pretext exists)?" If the 
latter is the test, what constitutes standard practice? Standard 
practice may require narcotics officers to execute traffic arrest 
warrants when they discover that such a warrant is outstanding 
for a suspected narcotics offender. In the latter instance the pol-
icy may depend not just on the desire to find narcotics. Officials 
may also desire to bring the full force of the law against a sus-
pected drug dealer even if they cannot establish a narcotics vio-
41. See Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 314 
So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1975). 
42. LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 53-54. 
43. For his discussion of LaFave's proposal, see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra 
note 6, at 107-11; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 532-36. 
44. Presumably narcotics detectives who make field stops of narcotics suspects do not 
always just let them go when the detectives learn that the suspects are wanted on out-
standing traffic warrants. They may often arrest such individuals even though the of-
ficers have already determined through a search (lawful or unlawful) that the suspects 
have no narcotics on their persons. Moreover, we should not assume that officers who 
specialize in narcotics enforcement have no other obligations. Even in a jurisdiction the 
size of Chicago, from time to time some officers specially assigned to narcotics enforce-
ment (such as "Task Force" officers) have been required to give priority to other law 
enforcement objectives. In smaller jurisdictions, it would frequently be meaningless to 
__ declare that an officer, though otherwise acting lawfully, departed from his or her pre-
scribed routine in enforcing an extant traffic warrant. 
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lation. Elsewhere courts have not provided a remedy for this 
type of selective enforcement of the law.•11 
Consider also the detective who arrests a narcotics suspect in 
the suspect's car pursuant to a narcotics arrest warrant related 
to a crime that occurred one month earlier. Absent probable 
cause, he or she cannot search the car's trunk under the automo-
bile exception.46 The officer might, however, have the right to 
take the automobile into police custody. 47 Suppose the officer 
then inventories the car in the manner that inventorying officers 
normally perform that function pursuant to departmental pol-
icy. Under LaFave's test would it make a difference whether of-
ficers employed as property custodians, but not detectives, nor-
mally performed inventories? What if narcotics detectives 
perform this function only when dealing with narcotics sus-
pects? What should constitute the standard practice? Should it 
make a difference which police officer performs a particular law-
ful police function? Finally, if the test of "standard" is whether, 
but for the suspicion of the presence of evidence, the officer 
would have done as he did, how is LaFave's test different from 
Burkoff's? 
However LaFave's test would operate, it, like Burkoff's, in-
volves case-by-case adjudication of whether evidence should be 
suppressed even though the police operated within the letter of 
an approved fourth amendment doctrine. 
C. The Hard-Choice Approach 
When faced with claims of sham, the Supreme Court, as de-
tailed below,48 has often reexamined the basic power that de-
fense counsel claims the police have used for an improper pur-
pose. Considering the possibility of pretextual use as just one 
45. Selective enforcement doctrine does not prohibit a prosecutor from seeking to 
make a case on a relatively minor charge, even where such matters ordinarily are not 
investigated and would not be investigated but for the prosecutor's belief that the target 
has committed major crimes. Selective prosecution doctrines protect only members of 
specially protected minorities or persons who exercise fundamental rights. See the dis-
cussion in United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). 
46. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981) (holding permitting search 
of containers within passenger compartment of a car "does not encompass the trunk."); 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970) (finding subsequent search of car at station 
house unlawful because not incident to arrest) (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 
364 (1964)). 
47. The officer might invoke a caretaking theory. See infra notes 100-07 and accom-
panying text. 
48. See infra text at notes 54-156. 
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factor in determining whether the power is consonant with the 
fourth amendment, the Court has either upheld the power or 
else restricted or abolished the power. I call this the hard-choice 
approach. 
To illustrate this approach, let me explain how it would work 
in a situation where Professor Burkoff and I find pretextual 
fourth amendment activity offensive, but where the Court has 
not yet used the hard-choice approach."9 Suppose that defense 
counsel claims that the police have executed a dated but valid 
traffic arrest warrant as a pretext to enter a narcotics suspect's 
house, hoping to discover heroin either in plain view or within 
the scope of a search incident to arrest. 
One approach would be to narrow the scope of the underlying 
power: the right to enter a home to execute an arrest warrant. 
The Supreme Court could declare that arrest warrants expire af-
ter a certain period of time, at least where the police efforts to 
execute the warrant have lapsed.110 Or the Court could make a 
less drastic alteration in fourth amendment law by declaring 
that after a period of time, absent continuous diligent effort to 
execute a misdemeanor arrest warrant, the warrant, though still 
valid for some purposes, would not authorize entry into a sus-
pect's home. The Court would reason that if authorities place 
such a low priority on a prompt arrest, the governmental inter-
est does not outweigh the individual's right to be free from po-
lice entry into his home at the nearly unbridled discretion of the 
police.111 Once the Court had struck a balance under the reasona-
bleness clause of the fourth amendment-perhaps by leaving the 
entry-to-arrest power exactly as it is now, or perhaps by narrow-
ing the power in some fashion-the police would be allowed to 
use the power, within the letter of the law as outlined by the 
Supreme Cou;t, without regard to their motives. A narrowing of 
police power would restrict opportunity and incentive for abuse. 
Unless the Court completely prohibited use of the power, how-
49. Burkoff discusses at length State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983), a 
case in which officers executed a contempt arrest warrant, allegedly to get into a sus-
pect's home so as to aid investigation of a more serious offense. The court explicitly 
rejected the individual motivation approach. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, 
supra note 6, at 538-44. 
50. Under prevailing interpretation of the fourth amendment, arrest warrants nor-
mally do not grow stale. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 451 n.16 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
51. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1984), in a warrantless entry con-
text, the Court, in judging the reasonableness of entry into a home, took into account 
what it perceived as the low priority that Wisconsin assigned to the offense for which the 
arrest was to be made. 
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ever, some possibility of pretextual use would remain. For exam-
ple, a narcotics detective might still be allowed to enter a sus-
pect's home to execute a day-old traffic arrest warrant where his 
predominant motivation was the hope of discovering narcotics. 
The Court would have taken into account possible pretextual 
use in shaping a particular fourth amendment power. Once it 
made its decision, however, the Court would not direct lower 
courts to make case-by-case decisions as to whether the police 
were engaged in pretextual conduct. 
As indicated below, the hard-choice approach is the one es-
poused by Justice Brennan and utilized by Justice Rehnquist.112 
It is the only approach to the pretext problem that the Supreme 
Court has used consistently. 53 
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO 
CLAIMS OF PRETEXT 
Professor Burkoff argues that the Supreme Court for a long 
time condemned pretextual fourth amendment activity but that 
now it has seemingly abandoned that concern. 114 His assertion 
depends upon an erroneous premise. Burkoff believes his solu-
tion to the pretext problem is the only one that reflects a sensi-
tivity to the pretext issue. Unless a court reacts on a case-by-
case basis to pretext claims and determines whether particular 
conduct was improperly motivated, Burkoff believes the court 
has abandoned all efforts to prevent pretextual fourth amend-
ment activity. He does not acknowledge that a court using the 
hard-choice approach can consider the possibility of a pretextual 
use of a particular police practice either by condemning · the 
practice as unreasonable or by narrowing the permissible scope 
of a fourth amendment power. 
In fact, unlike lower courts, the Supreme Court has never or-
dered lower court exclusion of evidence because on a particular 
occasion an officer, although acting within the fourth amend-
ment, was improperly motivated. Frequently, however, the 
Court has expanded fourth amendment limitations upon police 
in part to reduce the opportunity and incentive for officers to 
engage in pretextual fourth amendment activity. 
52. See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 54-156 and accompanying text. 
54. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 544-48. 
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A. Cases Discussed by Professor Burk off 
1. United States v. Lefkowitz- Pursuant to an arrest war-
rant, in United States v. Lefkowitz55 federal agents arrested a 
suspect in a partitioned office that was ten feet by twenty feet. 
They searched the room extensively, including waste baskets, 
closed desk drawers, and closed cabinets. They seized books, pa-
pers, and other articles. 
The Court stated: "The only question presented is whether 
the searches of the desks, waste baskets and of all drawers and 
closed cabinets and the seizure of the things taken from them 
were reasonable as an incident of the arrests."56 The Court an-
swered the question negatively by circumscribing the scope of a 
proper search incident to arrest. Chroniclers of the Court's fre-
quently changing course defining the proper scope of a "search 
incident" to arrest view Lefkowitz as one of the decisions that 
defined the scope narrowly. 57 To my knowledge, only Professor 
Burkoff has suggested that Lefkowitz condemned a search that 
was within the letter of the law because the officers' true motive 
in making the arrest was to engage in an unconstitutional 
search. His suggestion stems from a single sentence of dictum, at 
the end of the opinion, that declares that police officers should 
not use arrests as pretexts for searches. 58 
If Burkoff's reading were correct, the Court would have had to 
explore the officers' motive for making the arrests. The opinion 
contains no discussion condemning these motives. Moreover, if 
he were right, after Lefkowitz a search as extensive and inten-
sive as the one conducted there would have been proper as long 
as the officers' true motive was to make an arrest. This reading 
is inconsistent with the language in Lefkowitz condemning the 
search because of its scope. 
Perhaps the Court's single dictum concerning pretext arrests 
suggests that it was concerned that officers might abuse the right 
to arrest by making arrests motivated by the desire to search 
incident to arrest. If so, it reacted, much as it would later in 
(;himel v. California,59 by narrowing the power to search inci-
dent to arrest. It used the hard-choice approach outlined above. 
55. 285 U.S. 452 (1932). 
56. Id. at 463. 
57. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 757 (1969); Moylan, The Plain View Doc-
trine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER 
L. REV. 1047, 1058-60 (1975). 
58. 285 U.S. at 467. 
59. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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It did not call for case-by-case adjudication of an officer's mo-
tives for making an arrest. 
2. Jones v. United States- Professor Burkoff views 
Jones v. United States60 as excluding the use of evidence be-
cause arresting officers acted with improper motivation. 61 As 
does Professor LaFave,62 I view it as a case where the police re-
lied upon one theory to justify their conduct, but late in the le-
gal proceedings the prosecutors advanced an alternative theory. 
The Court found that the alternative theory would not justify 
the search because the officers' activities, for want of requisite 
intent, did not fit within the boundaries of that theory. 
To understand Jones we must call to mind the familiar crimi-
nal law distinction between motive and intent.63 Burkoff instead 
uses the words interchangeably. 64 Courts have repeatedly held 
that no proper search incident to arrest can exist absent an in-
tent to take the suspect into custody.66 Thus an intent to arrest 
is the conscious objective of taking a suspect into custody for the . 
purpose of charging him with an offense. The motive for the ar-
rest is the reason the officer decided to make the arrest. Intent 
concerns whether the officer acted within the letter of the law in 
conducting a search. Motive concerns whether the officer, while 
acting within the letter of the law, did so for an improper pur-
pose. Against this background we can understand Jones. 
In Jones, federal agents entering a home apparently held the 
belief that either of two theories justified their conduct. They 
had a properly issued search warrant. The warrant was good 
only for daytime searches; however, the officers entered after 
dark. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, prosecu-
tors abandoned the claim that the daytime warrant justified the 
entry.66 Alternatively, the agents claimed the right to enter with-
out a valid warrant because they had probable cause to believe 
that evidence of an ongoing crime existed within the premises. 
The Supreme Court held this an insufficient exigency to justify a 
60. 357 U.S. 493 (1958). 
61. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 545. 
62. See LAl<'AVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 45 n.101. 
63. See W. LAFAVE & A ScoTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 29, at 204 (1972); G. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5.5, at 452 (1978). 
64. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 524, 535. In most cases, no 
confusion is generated by the use of the words interchangeably. 
65. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 49 Ill. 2d 245, 274 N.E.2d 45 (1971). See also State v. 
Cotterman, 544 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Baker, 112 N.J. Super. 351, 271 
A.2d 435 (1970). 
66. 357 U.S. at 496. 
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warrantless entry.67 
Before the Supreme Court, prosecutors advanced a theory not 
previously suggested. They argued that the warrantless entry 
was justified as an entry to arrest a felon.68 The Court did not 
have to reach that question, however, because it found that the 
officers did not enter to arrest.69 Unless the officers entered with 
the intent to arrest, that is to take an occupant into custody for 
the purpose of charging him with an offense, an entry to arrest 
theory is inapplicable. 70 If police have the power to make a war-
rantless nighttime entry to arrest-an issue sidestepped in 
Jones-that power does not arise unless the entry is made with 
a plan to arrest a suspect, any more than the doctrine of search 
incident to arrest arises absent an intent to take a suspect into 
custody. 
Jones is thus a case where the officers' conduct (defined to 
include actions and intent) did not fit within the letter of the 
fourth amendment doctrine upon which the prosecution relied. 
The Jones Court was not faced with a case where the officer ac-
ted within the letter of the law but with an improper motive. 
Rather, it was a case where the letter of the law required a cer-
tain intent and that intent was absent. 
Lower court decisions are in accord with this interpretation of 
Jones.71 Consider a situation where officers have both a search 
warrant and probable cause to arrest a suspect who they reason-
ably believe to be on the premises named in the warrant. They, 
however, have not the slightest intent to arrest the suspect un-
less the search proves fruitful, perhaps because their probable 
cause comes from a professional informer who will not testify in 
court and whose uncorroborated testimony, at any rate, would 
not convince a jury of the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Officers search, find narcotics, and then arrest. The war-
rant, for technical reasons, turns out to be invalid. The prosecu-
tion seeks to justify the entry as a warrantless entry to arrest. 
The search can be justified as a search incident to arrest, prose-
cutors argue, even though it slightly preceded the arrest, as long 
67. Id. at 497-98. 
68. See LAFAVE Supp. supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 46; Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 
supra note 6, at 95-98. If that theory fit the facts, the Court would have been presented 
with a question discussed by both LaFave and Burkoff: where officers act under a theory 
that in fact cannot justify their conduct, should a court uphold their actions under an-
other theory that would justify their conduct? This is an interesting question, but not 
one involving an issue of pretext. 
69. 357 U.S. at 500. 
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 65. 
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as the officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect before 
they searched him. 72 
In this situation courts, citing Jones, have responded that the 
prosecution cannot rely on an entry-to-arrest theory because the 
police did not have the required intent to arrest when they en-
tered. 73 These courts have not had to discuss pretext issues be-
cause the officers, for want of requisite intent, did not act within 
the letter of the fourth amendment theory alleged to justify 
their conduct. Indeed, how can police officers abuse the power to 
enter for the purpose of arrest if they did not have the intent to 
arrest when they entered? 
This is not to say that there is no such thing as a pretextual 
entry to arrest. In many cases, defense lawyers have argued that 
officers entered premises with the intent to arrest, acting legally 
but motivated by the hope of discovering incriminating evi-
dence, either in plain view or in a search incident to arrest. 
These cases pose the pretext issue.74 Jones did not because, at 
least in the Supreme Court's view, for want of the requisite in-
tent, the officers did not act within the letter of the law. 711 
3. Abel v. United States- The next major Supreme Court 
opinion Professor Burkoff relies upon to illustrate the Supreme 
Court's former demonstration of concern regarding pretextual 
fourth amendment activity is Abel v. United States. 76 True, 
dictum in Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion suggests that 
the Court might exclude evidence, in an appropriate case, where 
the police, though acting within an approved fourth amendment 
72. These were the facts in People v. Cox, 49 Ill. 2d 245, 274 N.E.2d 45 (1971). 
73. See, e.g., id.; State v. Baker, 112 N.J. Super. 351, 271 A.2d 435 (1970). 
74. In cases where the officer entered a home while in possession of an arrest warrant 
and, in fact, executed the warrant, it is extraordinarily difficult to argue that the officers 
did not intend to make an arrest. Nevertheless, defense lawyers, by focusing on motive, 
often make out plausible pretext claims. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 
App. 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1975); State v. Hoven, 269 N.W.2d 
849 (Minn. 1978); Cf. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983). 
75. The Jones Court inferred a lack of intent to arrest from evidence which suggested 
that the officers did not have reason to believe that offenders were within the premises 
which they entered, 357 U.S. at 496 n.1, 500. In summarizing the Court's approach, I do 
not necessarily agree with it. Officers could have intent to arrest contingent upon the 
obvious requirement that a suspect will be found within the premises. The Court could 
have taken a different route without abandoning the hard-choice approach. It could have 
said that the entry was unlawful for want of probable cause to believe that some particu-
lar suspect was within, thus requiring (1) probable cause to believe that a particular 
person had committed a crime, and (2) probable cause to believe that such a suspect was 
within the premises. Concerning the first requirement, see Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10 (1948); People v. Harshbarger, 24 Ill. App. 3d 335, 321 N.E.2d 138 (1974). Con-
cerning the second requirement, see infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
76. 362 U.S. 217 (1960). See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 545. 
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doctrine, did so for an improper purpose. On the other hand, 
neither in Abel, where the claim of pretext was rather compel-
ling, nor in any other case has the Supreme Court acted in ac-
cordance with this suggestion. Frankfurter's formulation of what 
constituted pretextual fourth amendment activity made it diffi-
cult for defense counsel to invoke his dictum. On the other 
hand, Justice Brennan's dissent in Abel, never discussed by Pro-
fessor Burkoff, contains a strong attack upon the approach sug-
gested in Frankfurter's dictum, which is also Burkoff's solution. 
It instead endorses the concept of narrowing the fourth amend-
. ment doctrine that gives rise to the abuse, which is the solution I 
have discussed under the label "hard-choice." 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been investi-
gating Abel in connection with espionage. The Justice Depart-
ment felt that available evidence was too slim to justify an arrest 
or an indictment. An FBI agent then informed the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) that the FBI believed that 
Abel was an illegal alien. The FBI arranged to participate in the 
INS arrest of Abel on an administrative warrant: At his hotel 
room just before the arrest, INS agents allowed FBI officials to 
question Abel about espionage activities. When interrogation 
yielded no evidence, the FBI agents signalled the INS agents to 
arrest Abel on the deportation warrant. They then watched as 
INS agents searched the room incident to the administrative ar-
rest. After agents removed Abel and allowed him to check out of 
the hotel, FBI agents searched the room under the theory of 
abandonment. 
In the espionage prosecution, defense counsel sought to ex-
clude, on a pretext theory, evidence discovered during the search 
incident to the administrative arrest. They contended that the 
true purpose of the arrest was to discover evidence of espionage. 
They argued that an INS warrant cannot properly be used for 
such purpose. They claimed that government agents were not 
motivated by a desire to take Abel into custody pending the out-
come of deportation proceedings. 
Frankfurter wrote: "Were this claim justified by the record, it 
would indeed reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing of-
ficers. The deliberate use by the Government of an administra-
tive warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal 
case must meet stern resistance by the courts."77 Frankfurter 
did not state that such stern resistance should take the form of 
an exclusionary remedy, although some of his words implied 
77. 362 U.S. at 226. 
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that such relief would be proper in an appropriate case. 
In the case at hand, however, over a strong dissent by Justice 
Douglas,78 Frankfurter deemed. the Court bound by lower court 
determinations that the INS agents had acted in "good faith." 
Going beyond this specific determination, Frankfurter seemed to 
employ a test for "bad faith" that was very difficult to meet. He 
stressed that the INS acted on information about alleged alien-
age as they would in a case where no hint of a more serious 
crime existed. The agents simply obtained an administrative ar-
rest warrant and executed it with the assistance of the FBI. As 
Professor LaFave notes, Frankfurter's opinion in Abel empha-
sized that the INS officers did not depart from routine proce-
dures. 79 But, if the police need only follow standard procedures, 
what motivates the officer will be irrelevant and findings of pre-
text will almost never influence a suppression ruling. 
Frankfurter added other comments that make one wonder 
whether he would have found pretextual fourth amendment ac-
tivity in any case. Specifically, he denounced the notion that au-
thorities should lose the power to make a deportation arrest sim-
ply because they also suspect the arrestee of espionage.80 I 
interpret that denunciation to imply that courts should not pre-
vent an officer from making an otherwise valid traffic stop 
merely because the officer also suspects the driver of having ma-
rijuana in his or her car. Likewise, they should not prevent a 
police officer from conducting an otherwise proper inventory 
search merely because he also suspects that the search may yield 
heroin. Finally, Justice Frankfurter's denunciation suggests, as 
Justice Rehnquist has said, much to the consternation of Profes-
sor Burkoff, that there is nothing wrong with customs officials 
acting within the vessel document inspection exception to the 
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, even though the 
officials suspect they might observe contraband in plain sight 
once they board the· vessel. 81 Frankfurter's declaration that the 
government should not have to choose between two proper gov-
ernmental functions (deporting illegal aliens and investigating 
78. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas argued that the FBI agents' purpose 
was to obtain espionage evidence. He refused to invoke the term "bad faith" because he 
believed that such a purpose was perfectly natural. Id. at 245. He concluded, however, 
that FBI agents must not be allowed to utilize an immigration administrative arrest in 
pursuit of such a goal. Id. at 247. 
79. LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 51. 
80. 362 U.S. at 228-29. 
81. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). See infra 
notes 170-91 and accompanying text. 
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espionage)82 sounds as if he would not have condemned agents 
who acted within the letter of the law, even where surrounding 
circumstances strongly suggested a motive for using the letter of 
the law for some unintended purpose. 
Justice Brennan's dissent in Abel is the most extensive Su-
preme Court opinion analyzing pretextual search claims.83 Bren-
nan's proposed solution would remove the incentive to use an 
exception to the fourth amendment for the wrong reason by nar-
rowing the exception. He would have deemed unreasonable, 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, a search of an en-
tire hotel room incident to an administrative arrest. This ap-
proach in Abel mirrors one Brennan urged nearly a quarter cen-
tury later in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez: 84 narrow 
the governmental power instead of making case-by-case assess-
ments of whether government agents acted from improper mo-
tives, as Professor Burkoff would have courts do. In his Abel dis-
sent, Brennan specifically denounced the approach that 
Professor Burkoff later endorsed. In his eagerness to blame a 
Burger Court insensitive to individual rights for not adopting hi~ 
solution to the pretext problem, Burkoff has not once noted 
Brennan's opinion in Abel or the consistent approach that Bren-
nan took in Villamonte-Marquez. 
In Abel, Brennan specifically declared that it was useless to 
make the admissibility of evidence turn upon a question of good 
faith. 811 Once a court finds that the officers acted within the lim-
its of a recognized fourth amendment doctrine, it is impossible 
to state what the court should deem a subterfuge.86 He pointed 
out that a search incident to any administrative arrest might 
turn up evidence of a serious crime and "this possibility will be 
well known to the arresting officer."87 
Brennan then presented a logical means of determining an of-
ficer's true motive, suggesting that the more the officer had rea-
son to suspect a serious crime, the more we should suspect that 
he acted for an improper purpose. Brennan concluded, however, 
that the use of such a standard demonstrates the folly of the 
"bad faith" approach. "[l]t would appear a strange test as to 
82. 362 U.S. at 229. 
83. 362 U.S. 217, 248 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren, Justice 
Douglas, and Justice Black joined Brennan's dissent. 
84. 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 190-91 and 
accompanying text. 
85. 362 U.S. at 253. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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whether a search which turns up criminal evidence is unreasona-
ble, that the search is the more justifiable the less there was an-
tecedent probable cause to suspect the defendant of crime. "88 
Although some recent decisions that reject a bad faith approach 
reflect no awareness of Brennan's declaration, some courts have 
made the very same observation: when the letter of the law al-
lows certain fourth amendment activity, why should we prohibit 
such activity only when government agents have reason to sus-
pect serious crime?89 
At some length in Abel, Brennan suggested that the remedy is 
to narrow the power that gave rise to the abuse. He proposed 
circumscribing the scope of a search incident to arrest, at least 
where a neutral judicial magistrate does not authorize the arrest. 
He further declared "[t]he remedy is not to invite fruitless liti-
gation into purity of official motives or the specific direction of 
officials' motives."0O Echoing the Abel dissent of Justice Douglas, 
he added, "[o]ne must always assume that the officers are zeal-
ous to perform their duties. "91 
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire and Texas v. Brown-
Professor Burkoff also finds support for his position in the plu-
rality opinion of Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 92 That opinion 
declared that, subject to certain exceptions, a post-intrusive 
seizure of evidence in plain view is proper only if the discovery 
of such evidence is inadvertent.93 As Burkoff notes, the Court in 
Texas v. Brown°• left open the possibility that the fourth 
amendment requires inadvertence.95 
As Burkoff argues, in Coolidge the Supreme Court reflected 
obvious concern that officers would use the right of "entry to 
88. Id. 
89. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983) (citing 
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980)). See generally infra notes 226-30 and 
accompanying text. 
90. 362 U.S. at 254. 
91. Id. 
92. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
93. By a "post-intrusive" seizure I mean one made after the officers already have 
engaged in some fourth amendment activity, such as an entry to arrest. See generally 
Moylan, supra note 57, at 1073-78. Because the Coolidge plurality invoked the inadver-
tence concept in order to reduce incentive for pretextual use of fourth amendment activ-
ity, it would make no sense to limit the plain view doctrine where officers see evidence in 
a public place without having engaged in some prior search or seizure. 
94. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
95. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546-48. Thus Brown, 
without resolving the question, noted that some courts had refused to enforce an inad-
vertence limitation because only four of the Coolidge Justices had concurred in the por-
tion of the opinion which recognized such a limitation on plain view seizures. 460 U.S. at 
743 n.8. 
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arrest" in order to get onto the suspect's property (and often 
into his home) and spot evidence that, from their newly and law-
fully acquired vantage point, would be in plain sight. Indeed, 
numerous lawful fourth amendment intrusions-from stops of 
traffic offenders to inventories of an arrestee's vehicle-could be 
motivated by a desire to spot and seize evidence under the plain 
view doctrine. 
The Court did not, however, invoke Burkoff's approach. It did 
not declare that courts should invalidate a post-intrusive plain 
view seizure where the officer made the initial intrusion moti-
vated by the desire to gain a vantage point for spotting evidence. 
Instead the Coolidge Court used the hard-choice approach. It 
narrowed the doctrine that gives rise 1to the potential for abuse. 
The Court said that post-intrusive plain view seizures are only 
proper if the discoveries were inadvertent. Individual motives 
are irrelevant. What counts is whether the officers, before they 
set out to make the arrest, had a substantial reason to believe 
(typically quantified as probable cause) that they would discover 
the items.96 
Professor Burkoff finds an inconsistency between other recent 
decisions, such as Villamonte-Marquez97 and Texas v. 
Brown.98 He says that Brown shows a concern for pretext 
searches while other recent decisions do not.99 But both Brown 
and the other decisions reject Burkoff's approach. None calls for 
case-by-case examination of police officers' motives. Coolidge, 
Brown, and the other decisions like Villamonte-Marquez all 
show the hard-choice approach at work. To the extent that Coo-
lidge and Brown adopt an inadvertence requirement, the Court 
has examined a fourth amendment doctrine, found it susceptible 
to frequent pretextual use, and then narrowed the doctrine in 
the hope of reducing the possibility for abuse. 
5. South Dakota v. Opperman- Some observers of police 
activity believe that the police frequently use the inventory 
search power as a pretext for discovering incriminating evidence. 
Before South Dakota v. Opperman,100 some lower courts ex-
pressed fear of such pretextual use. Some employed the hard-
choice method and greatly limited the powers of the police to 
inspect property that had come into police custody. Others may 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. Daven-
port, 510 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973). 
97. See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text. 
98. Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546-48. 
99. Id. at 523-38, 547-48. 
100. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
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have embarked upon a case-by-case exploration of police moti-
vation.101 Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court was aware of the 
pretext possibility even though in Opperman no suggestion 
arose that the possibility of discovering evidence motivated the 
particular inventory. 
At any rate, the Opperman Court upheld the inventory search 
doctrine. Professor Burkoff finds in Opperman a judicial expres-
sion of concern in a single sentence: "As in Cady, there is no 
suggestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially 
like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext conceal-
ing an investigatory police motive."102 This sentence hardly di-
rects lower courts to embark upon a case-by-case analysis of po-
lice motives and suppress evidence when they detect an 
investigatory motive. Such an approach might be consistent with 
the quoted sentence, but it is not a course that the sentence 
commands. In fact, many lower courts responded by using the 
hard-choice approach. They reduced the number of instances 
where the police could properly invoke the inventory search the-
ory. Some reminded the police that a search is simply not an 
inventory unless performed in accordance with prescribed de-
partmental rules as to time, place, and procedures.103 Others 
limited the circumstances in which the police were allowed to 
take custody of property.104 Still others required the police to 
safeguard closed containers without inspecting their contents.1011 
All of these measures decrease the possibility that the police will 
use inventory searches motivated by a desire to find incriminat-
ing evidence. Of course, such decisions may also undermine 
somewhat the three purposes of inventory searches that the Su-
preme Court recognized as legitimate. 106 That is the hard choice 
101. For an extensive discussion, see United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 
1973). 
102. 428 U.S. at 376, cited in Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 78. 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Hud-
son, 390 A.2d 509 (Me. 1978). 
104. See, e.g., Arrington v. United States, 382 A.2d 14 (D.C. 1978); Session v. State, 
353 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); G.B. v. State, 339 So. 2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976); People v. Fox, 62 Ill. App. 3d 854, 379 N.E.2d 917 (1978). 
105. See, e.g., People v. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980), cert. denied, 
453 U.S. 923 (1981); People v. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 2d 457, 386 N.E.2d 53 (1979). The debate 
over whether authorities must secure containers without inspecting their contents pre-
dated Opperman. Compare United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970) (held 
that warrantless search of suitcase at police station was valid), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985 
(1971) with State v. McDougal, 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975) (held that war-
rantless search of locked suitcases was unreasonable). Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 
(1983), is arguably inconsistent with decisions that require authorities to secure contain-
ers without inventorying them. 
106. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The requirement that officers retain 
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that lower courts have made. 
Similarly, the four dissenting justices in Opperman, Marshall, 
Brennan, Stewart, and White, did not advocate that the Court 
adopt a case-by-case analysis of police motives for conducting an 
inventory search. 1O7 Instead, they indicated that, absent consent 
from the owner, the police simply should not be allowed rou-
tinely to inspect property that comes into their control. Justice 
Marshall's opinion did not argue that otherwise the police might 
misuse an inventory search to try to catch a criminal. He con-
tended instead that the right to search any citizen's property 
that falls into lawful police custody is an invasion of privacy that 
outweighs the reasons advanced as justifying the inventory 
search exception. Justice Marshall objected to the very existence 
of the power even when exercised for the reasons that the Op-
perman majority thought legitimate, and not just to the possi-
bility of misuse for the illegitimate purpose of gathering incrimi-
nating evidence. 
6. Steagald v. United States- According to Professor 
Burkoff, Steagald v. United States 108 exemplifies the Supreme 
Court's laudable application of "pretext search doctrine. "100 In 
fact, Steagald demonstrates the hard-choice approach at work 
and contains not a hint of support for Professor Burkoff's case-
by-case, individual motivation methodology. 
Burkoff notes that the Steagald Court spoke of the potential 
for pretextual searches that would have existed had the Court 
adopted the Government's position.110 The Court said that en-
tries of third persons' homes, made for the purpose of arresting 
a suspect within, might have been employed as pretexts for 
searches of the homes. Because of the pretext possibility and 
other reasons, the Court mandated the use of search warrants in 
most instances where police enter a third person's home in the 
exercise of their right to arrest a suspect. By imposing a search 
warrant requirement, the Court expanded a fourth amendment 
limitation, partly from a desire to reduce the opportunity for 
pre textual use of the power. This is the hard-choice approach, 
pure and simple. 
Under Burkoff's case-by-case methodology, the Court would 
custody of a container without inspecting its contents undermines the second and possi-
bly the third rationales for inventory searches: protection against false claims of theft 
and against dangers posed by the property. 
107. 428 U.S. 364, 384 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (1976). 
108. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
109. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546. 
110. Id.; see 451 U.S. at 215. 
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have reacted quite differently when presented with a claim that 
the possibility of pretextual searches arises from the doctrine es-
poused by the Government. The Court would have permitted 
the police, armed only with an arrest warrant, to enter a third 
person's home to arrest a suspect reasonably believed to be 
within. The Court, however, would require exclusion of any evi-
dence found within when an analysis of the individual facts 
demonstrated that the officers' true motive for entering was the 
hope of discovering evidence. The Supreme Court simply did 
not take this approach in Steagald. In lauding the Steagald 
Court, Burkoff has unwittingly lauded the hard-choice approach 
to pretextual search problems. 
7. Massachusetts v. Painten- From his reading of Justice 
White's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. Painten,m Pro-
fessor Burkoff draws inferences about the majority's views in 
that case.112 He suggests that the inferred majority viewpoint 
demonstrates the Court's concern about pretextual fourth 
amendment activity. I doubt whether this is so, but, at any rate, 
I feel certain that nothing in Painten constitutes support for 
Burkoff's solution to pretext problems. 
The Painten dissent summarized the lower courts' view of the 
Painten facts. 113 Police officers went to the suspect's home de-
termined to make a warrantless entry, even though they lacked 
probable cause to arrest the suspect. The officers, however, did 
not carry out their plan to enter without probable cause. They 
obtained probable cause before they entered because Painten, in 
response to the approach of the police, engaged in activities, vis-
ible to the police, that created probable cause. 
Justice White argued that if all this were true, the Court still 
should not require the suppression of evidence. However willing 
they were to violate the law, the officers did not do so because 
they had probable cause before they entered.114 As Burkoff ac-
knowledges, Painten presented no pretext issue. It concerned 
the significance of an unfulfilled plan to violate the Constitu-
tion. 1111 Pretext problems occur where the officers, motivated by 
an improper purpose, utilize a recognized fourth amendment 
doctrine to justify their conduct. 116 
lll. 389 U.S. 560 (1968). 
ll2. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 77-78. 
ll3. 389 U.S. at 563-64 (White, J., dissenting). 
ll4. Id. at 564-65. 
ll5. Burkoff makes this point at length. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra 
note 6, at 99-100. 
ll6. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
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Painten's significance to the pretext debate lies in the broad 
language of White's dissent that declares that "sending state 
and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police of-
ficers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judi-
cial resources."117 Some who would condemn Professor Burkoff's 
"bad motivation" approach invoke White's language. 118 As I 
note below, I do not subscribe to the simplistic notion that 
Burkoff's approach is wrong because it is hopeless to try to de-
termine what was in a police officer's mind.119 Nevertheless, I 
cannot make the quantum leaps necessary to find support for 
Burkoff's position in the Painten majority's actions. The major-
ity in Painten simply vacated the grant of certiorari because it 
found the record too unclear to resolve important constitutional 
questions. Even if, with Professor Burkoff, we drew the conclu-
sion that the majority disagreed with Justice White's expres-
sions concerning governing principles, we would not necessarily 
conclude that the majority favored the individual motivation 
resolution of pretextual search problems. 
Recall that Painten did not pose a pretextual search problem. 
One can disagree with the broad proposition that inquiries "into 
the minds of police officers" should be irrelevant to a resolution 
of fourth amendment issues without endorsing such an inquiry 
to resolve the pretextual search issue. As Burkoff has noted120 
and as I discuss below,121 in some fourth amendment contexts 
the Supreme Court has deemed such an inquiry relevant. As 
Burkoff has again noted,122 a context involving an unfulfilled 
plan to violate the law (as in Painten) is different from a context 
involving a fulfilled plan to adhere to the letter of the law moti-
vated by improper reasons (as in pretext searches). Perhaps the 
majority in Painten, if it had reached the issue, could have ar-
gued that a need exists to deter officers who intend to violate the 
law (as in Painten), but no need exists to deter officers who are 
determined to follow the letter of the law (as in pretext 
searches). At any rate, Professor Burkoff's apparent agreement 
with the result reached by the dissenters in Paint en, 123 together 
with his adherence to an individual motivation approach in pre-
text searches, demonstrates, as he acknowledges, that resolution 
117. 389 U.S. at 565. 
118. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
120. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 107. 
121. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
122. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 99-100. 
123. Id. at 100. 
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of the Painten issue need not dictate resolution of the pretex-
tual search issue. 
8. Other miscellaneous opinions- Professor Burkoff cites 
other majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions to demon-
strate Supreme Court concern for pretext searches in the era 
before Scott and Villamonte-Marquez. All contain the word 
"pretext," but none lends support to Burkoff's proposed resolu-
tion of pretextual search issues. · 
Colorado v. Bannister124 involved a Carroll search of a vehi-
cle after an officer approached the car to issue a ticket for a 
moving violation and observed in plain view incriminating evi-
dence that created probable cause to search. Burkoff points to a 
footnote for support of his approach: "There was no evidence 
whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation 
was a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about the 
occupants."1211 The Court in United States v. Robinson126 simi-
larly noted the absence of evidence of pretext. The Supreme 
Court, however, did not say what it w·ould have done if it had 
found evidence of pretext in Bannister or Robinson. In Robin~ 
son, for example, perhaps strong evidence of pretext would have 
persuaded the Court to prohibit searches incident to traffic ar-
rests absent some objective data establishing the likelihood that 
a search would produce a weapon or evidence of the offense for 
which the police officer made the arrest. Neither in Bannister 
nor in Robinson does the Court suggest that courts should ex-
clude the fruits of a search, on a case-by-case basis, where evi-
dence supports the claim of pretext. 
Burkoff also cites a footnote in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for 
the Court in United States v. Ceccolini. 127 There the Court 
treated the scope of derivative evidence principles and said 
nothing about pretextual search issues. The majority refused to 
suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity as a potential 
witness had been discovered through a violation of the defen-
dant's fourth amendment rights. Rehnquist declared that the 
Court's analysis might have been different if officers had vio-
lated a suspect's rights for the "specific purpose of discovering 
witnesses. "128 
124. 449 U.S. 1 (1980). 
125. 449 U.S. at 4 n.4, cited in Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 
546. 
126. 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973). 
127. 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978), cited in Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra 
note 6, at 546 n.106. 
128. Id. 
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This footnote suggests that even Justice Rehnquist might 
agree-contrary to Justice White's broad assertion in 
Painten-that sometimes a fourth amendment issue should turn 
upon what is in a police officer's mind. But if motivation has a 
proper role in derivative evidence analysis, it does not necessa-
rily follow that courts ought to apply an individual motivation 
approach in the quite different context of pretextual search is-
sues. When the Court in Brown v. Illinois129 deemed the of-
ficer's "purpose" relevant to the suppression of a statement se-
cured following an illegal arrest, it might have been at odds with 
White's dissent in Painten, but surely it said nothing about 
_pretextual use of lawful fourth amendment activity. 
Burkoff also relies upon other opinions of individual Justices 
to support his approach to problems of pretext searches and ar-
rests. Burkoff notes Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion to 
the Court's dismissal of the writ of certiorari in Wainwright 
v. City of New Orleans.130 Warren believed that the record 
clearly indicated that authorities arrested Wainwright on a va-
grancy charge to gain a chance to interrogate him about a mur-
der. The Chief Justice declared that "using a minor and imagi-
nary charge to hold an individual . . . deserves unqualified 
condemnation.''131 
The word "imaginary" suggests that Warren believed the po-
lice lacked probable cause for a vagrancy arrest. Thus, in his 
view, the case was not one where the police acted within the 
fourth amendment. We are left to speculate about what Warren 
would have said if he had believed that the police had acted 
within the fourth amendment but for an improper purpose. 
Would he, have condemned the police, and what form would that 
condemnation have taken? Wainwright contains no evidence 
that Chief Justice Warren would have supported Professor 
Burkoff's case-by-case approach to pretextual search problems. 
Finally, consider Burkoff's citation of Frankfurter's dissent in 
United States v. Rabinowitz. 132 Burkoff quotes text from that 
dissent that one can read to express concern that the police 
might use the powers to enter to arrest and to search incident to 
129. 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). 
130. 392 U.S. 598, 600 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), discussed in Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 79 n.46. Contrary to Burkoff's assertion, the case had 
nothing to do with whether evidence should be excluded. 
131. 392 U.S. at 607. 
132. 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), cited in Burkoff, Pretext 
Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546 n.106. 
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arrest as a pretext to conduct warrantless searches of homes. 133 
Yet Professor Burkoff ignores Frankfurter's proposed solution: 
limiting the right to search incident to arrest and the scope of 
such a search to instances where delay in obtaining a warrant 
would frustrate the legitimate reasons for a search incident to 
arrest. 134 Frankfurter thus would have narrowed a particular 
fourth amendment power in part from a desire to limit opportu-
nities for pretextual searches. He acted in accordance with the 
hard-choice approach and avoided case-by-case analysis of po-
lice officers' motivation. 
B. Cases Not Discussed by Professor Burkoff: Chimel, 
Payton, and Others 
Undoubtedly all of us who have written about pretextual 
fourth amendment activity have overlooked some Supreme 
Court cases where defendants raised the specter of pretext. In 
Zap v. United States, 1311 for example, the defendants unsuc-
cessfully advanced an argument similar to the one iater made in 
Abel136 concerning the use by the FBI of administrative powers 
as a guise to aid law enforcement authorities in gathering evi-
dence for prosecution. Without examining the briefs in all fourth 
amendment litigation before the Court, we cannot learn of every 
instance where defendants asked the Court to consider pretext 
possibilities. 
There are, however, at least two decisions not discussed by 
Professor Burkoff that I believe we should consider in discussing 
claims of pretext, Chimel v. California137 and Payton 
v. New York. 138 Although not directly confronted by claims of 
pretext in those cases, the Supreme Court used the hard-choice 
approach to narrow the opportunities authorities would have to 
manipulate the powers of arrest, entry to arrest, and search inci-
dent to arrest. 
In the years before the Chimel decision, police were often sus-
pected of using arrest and related powers to maximize the possi-
bility of discovering, without search warrants, evidence of the 
crime · for which they made the arrest. For example, the police 
133. Id. 
134. 339 U.S. at 79, 84, 85. 
135. 328 U.S. 624 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). 
136. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text. 
137. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
138. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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might bypass opportunities to arrest· a suspected felon until he 
entered his home. Then, without an arrest warrant or a search 
warrant, they would enter his home, arrest him, and conduct a 
search of the entire home "incident to arrest."139 Or they might 
go to the arrestee's house, intending to arrest him if he were 
home, but primarily motivated by an opportunity to make 
"plain view" observations anywhere in his home (including 
closets) where the suspect conceivably might be hiding. Natu-
rally, the police claimed the power to seize any incriminating ev-
idence spotted during the course of their search for the 
suspect.140 
The Chimel Court noted the possibility that authorities would 
delay efforts to arrest until a suspect had entered his home. 141 In 
response, it chose to restrict the scope of a proper search inci-
dent to arrest to that area that was within the arrestee's 
reach. 142 Chimel thus reduced the incentive for police to bypass 
opportunities to arrest a suspect until after he had entered his 
house. It did not, however, eliminate the incentive altogether. 
The police could still make plain view observations in some 
parts of the suspect's home. They also could still search areas of 
the home within the arrestee's reach. 
Professor Burkoff fails to tell us how he would resolve the 
problem of the "timed" or "delayed" arrest. "Delayed" police 
conduct does not fit his definition of a pretextual arrest. The 
officer does not arrest the suspect motivated solely by a desire to 
obtain evidence concerning a separate offense. 143 The officer's 
purposes are to secure successful criminal prosecution on the 
very charge for which he makes the arrest. Indeed, even if "pre-
dominant" motivation determined whether an arrest were 
pretextual, we still would have difficulty classifying delayed ar-
rests as pretextual. The problem of delayed arrests is not the 
pretextual use of an arrest to gather unrelated but incriminating 
evidence, but rather the timing of the arrest so as to maximize 
the possibility of obtaining evidence. The pretextual arrest vo-
cabulary simply does not fit. 
Nevertheless, I assume Professor Burkoff, with his admirable 
139. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 (1970), cert. denied, 
407 U.S. 914 (1972), a case where, as a defense lawyer, I unsuccessfully urged the Illinois 
Supreme Court to adopt a Payton-type rule. 
140. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
141. 395 U.S. at 767. 
142. Id. at 763. 
143. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 103-04; Burkoff, Pretext 
Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 534 n.52. 1 
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desire for intellectual consistency, would use an individual moti-
vation test. He probably would have responded to the delayed 
arrest problem by instructing judges to determine the officers' 
true motive for delaying an arrest. If judges found that officers 
delayed in order to be able to enter the suspect's home in quest 
of evidence, Burkoff probably would have directed the suppres-
sion of evidence found within. 144 If not, he may well have contin-
ued to tolerate expansive searches incident to arrest. By con-
trast, the Supreme Court used the hard-choice approach, 
ignoring individual motivation and narrowing the scope of 
searches incident to arrest. 
In Payton, the Court further limited the incentive for police 
to use the delayed arrest tactic. The Court mandated the use of 
arrest warrants for non-consensual, non-emergency entries to ar-
rest. 1411 Of course, armed with an arrest warrant, the police still 
can delay efforts to arrest a suspect until after he has entered 
his home. In two respects, however, the Payton arrest warrant 
requirement should discourage use of the delayed arrest as a tac-
tic for avoiding the search warrant requirement. As Professor 
Burkoff has reminded us,m pretextual activity often occurs be-
cause officers do not want to expend the time and energy neces-
sary to get a warrant. It is not always true that officers who use a 
pretext lack probable cause necessary to get a warrant. Some of-
ficers avoid the warrant process at all costs. 147 After Payton they 
might choose to make arrests in a public place where arrest war-
rants are not mandated, thereby sacrificing the evidentiary ad-
vantages that follow from delaying an arrest until the suspect is 
at home. Second, some officers who choose to make a non-emer-
gency arrest at the suspect's home, even though that requires a 
warrant, might also apply for a search warrant as long as they 
must apply for an arrest warrant. In either event, the Payton 
rule results in fewer delayed entries to arrest that are motivated 
by the desire to obtain evidence in the suspect's home without a 
search warrant. 
The Court in dictum in Payton also addressed another abuse 
of the power to enter to arrest. A significant number of pre-Pay-
144. Prosecutors might offer other explanations to justify the police delay. For exam-
ple, they might assert that public safety is better served by an arrest in a home rather 
than on the street. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1983). 
145. 445 U.S. at 603. 
146. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 101. 
147. I will always recall the boast of Detective Butz that in fifteen years on the police 
force he had never obtained a warrant. People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 
(1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972) (Abstract of Record 20). See supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
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ton cases followed a scenario that the- police repeated in Payton 
itself. In this scenario, the police enter a home, ostensibly to 
make an arrest, but fail to find the suspect inside. While looking 
in places where the suspect might be hiding, however, they come 
upon and seize incriminating evidence. The police have acted 
lawfully. The power to enter to arrest and the plain view doc-
trine, in combination, allow such lawful seizures.148 From his dis-
cussion of Jones, I assume that Professor Burkoff would make 
legality of these seizures turn upon whether the officers' true 
motive was to make an arrest or was instead to discover incrimi-
nating evidence.149 Before Payton some trial judges used just 
such a method. no 
The Court, however, implicitly rejected such an approach in 
dictum in Payton. It instead required that the police have prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect is within at the time they 
enter.m This requirement eliminates the possibility of pretext 
entries in most cases where a trial judge, using the individual 
motivation approach, would have suppressed evidence. 1112 
Once again, then, the Supreme Court used the hard-choice ap-
proach. As usual, that approach involved some impairment of 
law enforcement interests. Much merit resided in the old Illinois 
rule under which an officer, with probable cause to arrest a sus-
pect, could enter the suspect's home as long as any real possibil-
148. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. 
Morales, 48 Ill. 2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 33 (1971); People v. Sprovieri, 43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 
N.E.3d 531 (1969). 
149. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 79-81. 
150. See People v. Sprovieri, 43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969), aff'g 95 Ill. App. 
2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1968). The trial judge there had made an express finding that the 
officers had entered for the purpose of discovering evidence and not to arrest the defen-
dant. Although I argued this case for the State, I must concede that the evidence sup-
ported his finding. The testimony suggested that the suspect might have fled twenty-four 
hours earlier. The officers looked through an undraped window and saw no one in the 
house. They entered and found no one. They then went to a garage and, through a key-
hole, were able to see all but one corner of the garage. They saw no one. They entered 
the garage on an "entry to arrest" theory and found in plain view a bloody bicycle chain 
which might have been the murder weapon. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected an indi-
vidual motivation approach. It also held that the officers did not need probable cause to 
believe that Sprovieri was in the garage. The court reasoned that where the officers have 
probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a crime, it is reasonable for them 
to look for him at his home before turning the quest elsewhere. 
151. 445 U.S. 573, 583, 602-03 (1980). See also id. at 616 n.3 (White, J., dissenting); 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 n.6 (1981). 
152. Viewing the objective evidence, in cases where the evidence suggests that the 
officers had little reason to believe that the suspect was at home, a court is likely to 
conclude that the purpose in entering was a quest for evidence. See, e.g., People v. 
Sprovieri, 43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969), aff'g 95 Ill. App. 2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 
(1968). 
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ity existed that the suspect might be inside. 1113 By requiring 
probable cause to believe that the suspect is within, the Court in 
Payton's dictum attached greater value to the sanctity of the 
home while, at the same time, it reduced the possibility that po-
lice would make pretextual use of the power to enter to arrest. 
C. A Summary of the Supreme Court Approach: The Hard-
Choice Methodology at Work 
Like Professor Burkoff, I have found many instances in which 
the Supreme Court evidenced concern over the possibility of 
pretextual use of a fourth amendment power. I have found none, 
however, where a majority of the Justices has directed the sup-
pression of evidence upon a determination that the police ob-
tained such evidence through pretextual conduct. I cannot even 
find clear dictum that supports such an approach, unless I erro-
neously consider references to the pretext problem to be calls for 
the case-by-case solution that Burkoff endorses. Justice Douglas, 
speaking for himself in Abel, is the only Justice who has ever 
endorsed the individual motivation approach. 1114 His dissent oc-
curred in a case that, I believe, presented a strong claim that 
authorities had acted pretextually. 11111 
By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently taken into 
account the possibility of pretextual fourth amendment activity 
in determining whether to expand a particular fourth amend-
ment limitation upon police conduct. Sometimes it has left po-
lice practices untouched, sometimes it has narrowed the scope of 
police practices; always it has considered governmental and indi-
vidual interests and not just pretext possibilities. This is the 
hard-choice approach. 1116 
153. See People v. Morales, 48 Ill. 2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 33 (1971); People v. Sprovieri, 
43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 53 (1969); People v. Stibal, 56 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 372 N.E.2d 
931 (1978); People v. Carter, 132 Ill. App. 2d 572, 270 N.E.2d 603 (1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 962 (1972). 
154. 362 U.S. 217, 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See supra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 
155. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text. 
156. If anyone remains unconvinced, let that person take up this challenge: represent 
before the highest court of a state an accused who advances the argument that the trial 
judge should have suppressed evidence because a police officer's conduct was improperly 
motivated by a quest for evidence. Try to find United States Supreme Court decisions to 
support the contention that the Court has utilized or spoken approvingly of the individ-
ual motivation approach. I suspect that most persons will do as I did as defense counsel 
in the summer of 1984: abandon efforts to rely on Supreme Court authority and resort to 
the use of lower court opinions. That seems a wiser course than selecting a sentence of 
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IV. THE CURRENT CASES: Scott u. · United States AND United 
States u. Villamonte-Marquez 
A. Scott 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Scott u. United 
States,157 both Professor Burkoff and Professor LaFave sug-
gested that Scott might have great significance for the pretext 
search debate. Burkoff was somewhat tentative, outlining, both 
then and later, a variety of interpretations of Scott. 1 r,s Although 
critical of Scott's underpinning, LaFave seemed to read Scott as 
firmly dictating a rejection of the "individual motivation" test 
endorsed by Professor Burkoff. u 9 In retrospect, Burkoff and 
LaFave may be proved to have been right in emphasizing the 
importance of Scott to pretext issues. I wonder, however, if their 
analysis of Scott did not function as a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
making respectable an interpretation which is not at all obvious 
from a reading of that decision. 
Simply put, Scott did not involve a pretext claim. The issue 
was whether authorities complied with a statutory and constitu-
tional requirement, not whether they acted for an improper pur-
pose while acting within an accepted fourth amendment doc-
trine. More particularly, the Court considered whether, in 
conducting certain court-authorized wiretaps, agents honored 
the statutory requirement that interceptions "shall be conducted 
Supreme Court dictum here or there which will appear very weak under any close scru-
tiny of what the Court actually did in the cited cases. See Appellant's Brief at 37-40, 
People v. Hattery, No. 58789 (Ill. Nov. 21, 1985) (available Jan. 6, 1986, on LEXIS, 
States library, Ill. file). The facts there are basically those of the hypothetical outlined in 
the text accompanying infra note 206. 
157. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
158. See Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 6, at 181-90; 
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 81-84; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, 
supra note 6, at 525-30. I find especially puzzling Burkoff's suggestion that Scott might 
have forbidden consideration of "subjective" evidence of pretext while permitting "ob-
jective" evidence. See id. at 530, 532. By subjective evidence, Burkoff seems to mean the 
testimony of the officer as to his own motive. By objective evidence, Burkoff seems to 
mean circumstantial evidence of motive or what he calls "extrinsic rather than testimo-
nial evidence," a dichotomy which escapes my understanding. Id. at 526. I find abso-
lutely no support for this interpretation of Scott. That decision, in a particular context, 
declared motive irrelevant to legality. It was not concerned with whether the proof of an 
improper motive was established by an admission of the officer rather than by an infer-
ence drawn from testimony concerning the circumstances of the intrusion. Burkoff never 
explains why a court might condemn a search because of an inference of an officer's bad 
motive but not because of the officer's direct admission of a bad motive. 
159. LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 19-84. 
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in such a way to minimize the interception of communications 
not otherwise subject to interception."160 The agents intercepted 
all conversations over a particular phone for a period of one 
month. They monitored each such conversation to its conclu-
sion. They did not act in accordance with any criteria designed 
to require termination of monitoring of apparently innocent and 
non-targeted conversations. 
The Court decided that "subjective intent alone does not 
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."161 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion adopted what he termed 
"an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time."162 Under 
this approach, Justice Rehnquist analyzed what would have hap-
pened if authorities had adopted standards designed to prevent 
the monitoring of non-target conversations without frustrating 
the purposes of the interception order. He concluded that the 
result would have been about the same. 163 Agents would have 
terminated the monitoring of few, if any, of the conversations. 
Whether courts should construe minimization in this "objec-
tive" fashion, without regard to the agent's apparent willingness 
to make no effort to avoid interception of any conversations, 
however unrelated to the authorized surveillance, is an interest-
ing question. In defense of the Scott result, perhaps we can anal-
ogize the issue, as Burkoff once did, 164 to the one outlined in 
Justice White's Painten dissent:· where agents are willing to vio-
late the law if necessary but do nothing unlawful, should we in-
voke an exclusionary remedy?1611 We can also note the anomaly 
of reaching two different results in cases where agents engage in 
identical conduct, solely because one acted with a pure heart 
while another was willing to disregard legal requirements. 
Whether we should define "minimization" to exclude all refer-
ences to an agent's purpose, however, does not necessarily dic-
tate whether we should exclude an agent's purpose in all analy-
ses of the constitutionality of governmental action. Professor 
Burkoff has also recognized, unlike Professor LaFave, that the 
Court has debated the relevance of purpose in a wide variety of 
constitutional law contexts166 and has ascribed relevance to pur-
160. 436 U.S. at 130. 
161. Id. at 136. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 141-42. 
164. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
165. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. · 
166. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
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pose according to the particular context.167 He expressed the 
hope that the Court would not import the discussion of purpose 
from the minimization debate for use in the pretextual search 
debate.168 After United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, how-
ever, he expressed the belief that perhaps his worst fears had 
come true. 169 
B. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez 
In Villamonte-Marquez110 the Supreme Court considered the 
validity of one portion of a statute that authorized customs 
agents to engage in a variety of warrantless intrusions against 
certain vessels.171 Specifically, the Court passed judgment on the 
portion of the statute that allows officials to board a vessel and 
inspect the vessel's documentation. The Court recognized that 
one purpose of the document-inspection provision is to assist 
agents in detecting efforts to import contraband substances.172 
A single footnote in the majority opinion indicates that de-
fense counsel made a claim of pretext.173 Although the Court 
does not spell out that argument in detail, we can hypothesize 
concerning the nature of the pretext claim in the terms defined 
in this article. A proper purpose of the board-and-inspect-docu-
ments power is to allow authorities to read written documents 
that might help create cause for a warrantless search. A proper 
purpose, however, is not to allow authorities to board the ship to 
167. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 114. I do not find this point 
made in LaFave's discussion of Scott. See LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 43-54. 
168. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
169. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 524. 
170. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
171. Unfortunately the Court does not quote the full statute, expressly focusing only 
on the document inspection power. In fact, the statute authorizes warrantless searches of 
vessels in quest of contraband, without any requirement of reasonable suspicion or prob-
able cause. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), (g) (1982). The Court explicitly chose not to rule on 
the validity of that power. Yet that portion of the statute clearly indicates that Congress 
enacted the statute to aid authorities in their efforts to discover contraband. 
172. The Court wrote that documentation laws assist "in the prevention of entry into 
this country of controlled substances ... " 462 U.S. at 591. Professor Burkoff does not 
squarely acknowledge that a rationale for document inspection deemed legitimate by the 
Court is to aid authorities in detecting smuggling. He never really says what he believes 
to be the proper purpose of the document inspection power. Yet we must know this if we 
are to determine whether use of the power was pretextual. See supra notes 10-12 and 
accompanying text. Burkoff seems to assume that the proper purposes of vessel docu-
ment inspections are entirely analogous to the proper purposes of motor vehicle title and 
driver's license inspections and exclude the need to prevent the smuggling of contraband. 
173. 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. 
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gain a position to make "plain view" observations of non-im-
portable items such as narcotics. In Villamonte-Marquez, evi-
dence established that the boarding was motivated by the hope 
of making plain view observations of narcotics. Hence, the trial 
court should have suppressed evidence observed and seized 
under plain view principles.174 
Professor Burkoff seems outraged that the majority, which up-
held the document-inspection provision, did not apply the pre-
text doctrine to suppress the evidence. 176 Yet he is completely 
silent about Justice Brennan's dissent, 176 which makes no sug-
gestion that the Court should have utilized an individual moti-
vation test to require exclusion of the evidence. In fact, Vil-
lamonte-Marquez was an especially poor case in which to 
employ Burkoff's recommended approach. 
The pretext claim in Villamonte-Marquez consisted of proof 
that the officers had some reason to believe that the ship in 
question was transporting narcotics. Recall that a legitimate 
purpose of a document inspection (assuming the validity of the 
statute) is to allow authorities to gain, from a document inspec-
tion, cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vessel. 177 Ac-
cordingly, the very evidence supporting the claim that the of-
ficers sought to use the document-inspection exception as a 
guise to gain a vantage point for plain view observations would 
also constitute evidence that the officers were motivated by 
desires to get further probable cause to search through a docu-
ment inspection. It would be impossible, therefore, to tell 
whether the motive was predominantly legitimate (to gain evi-
dence through a document inspection) or illegitimate (to gain 
evidence through plain view observations) without officers' ad-
missions of their motivations. Under Professor Burkoff's test, 
which requires the officers' motive be entirely illegitimate, a 
claim of pretext could never prevail absent the officers' admis-
sion that their sole purpose was to make plain view observations. 
I assume, of course, that the officers acted within the letter of 
the law. They must either have made a document inspection or 
have embarked upon a course that suggested that they would 
have made such an inspection if their plain view observations of 
174. I do not mean to suggest that Burkoff or the respondents would have articulated 
the pretext argument in this fashion. If one assumes that the authority to inspect docu-
ments is not intended to aid the quest for marijuana, one can make a much simpler 
pretext claim. 
175. Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 528-36. 
176. 462 U.S. at 693 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
177. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
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incriminating evidence had not intervened before they reached 
the documents. If my assumption is incorrect, no pretext prob-
lem exists because the officers did not act within the scope. of 
their document-inspection power.178 
Numerous "administrative search" statutes allow entry to in-
spect documents of regulated industries in search of clues that 
suggest a violation of the law.179 Agents might use these powers 
in the hope of making plain view observations of contraband. 
Professor Burkoff's "sole motivation" test for pretext proves 
useless in most of these cases because evidence that suggests 
that the desire to obtain evidence about contraband motivated 
agents to try to make plain view observations will also demon-
strate a motive to inspect the documents for clues about other 
criminal activity. 
More generally, Villamonte-Marquez demonstrates a major 
problem that occurs in most situations where Burkoff's proposal 
serves as a solution to the pretext problem. Absent an officer's 
admission of an improper motive, Burkoff's approach would rely 
upon circumstantial evidence to establish that an officer's real 
reason for exercising a fourth amendment power was to make a 
warrantless search for evidence. The more reasons authorities 
had to believe that incriminating evidence was at hand, the 
stronger the claim that the desire to obtain such evidence moti-
vated authorities to search. This leads to the anomaly that Jus-
tice Brennan articulated in his Abel dissent and that I elabo-
rated upon in my 1977 article: "[l]t would appear a strange test 
as to whether a search which turns up criminal evidence is un-
reasonable, that the search is the more justifiable the less there 
was antecedent probable cause to suspect the defendant of 
crime. " 180 
The Villamonte-Marquez Court, without citing Brennan's 
views in Abel, made the identical point in disposing of the pre-
text claim by way of a footnote. It cited a 1980 First Circuit 
opinion that declared: "We would see little logic in sanctioning 
such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding 
178. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The officers who discover crimi-
nal evidence before completing the document inspection need not complete the inspec-
tion. Compare cases holding that an officer who makes a traffic stop and discovers evi-
dence of a serious crime need not complete steps necessary to prosecute the traffic 
violation. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956); People v. Edge, 
406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950); People v. Ambrose, 84 Ill. App. 2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 517 
(1967). 
179. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 880 (1982); 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1982). 
180. 362 U.S. at 253 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Haddad, supra note 7, at 212. 
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them in the case of suspected smugglers. " 181 In summarizing ar-
guments against the individual motivation approach, I will ex-
pand upon this point below. 182 
The Villamonte-Marquez Court also asserted that the defend-
ant's "line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in 
Scott."183 But Scott did not concern a pretext search. It con-
demned a "subjective" approach to fourth amendment analysis 
in an entirely different context.184 As Professor Burkoff notes, 
rejection of an "individual motivation" or "bad faith" approach 
in resolving the minimization dispute in Scott does not compel 
rejection of such an approach in the pretextual search context. 1811 
Because the Scott defendants had made no claim of pretext, 
the declaration that the claim in Scott involved the same rea-
~oning advanced in Villamonte-Marquez might puzzle the aver-
age reader of Scott. Professor LaFave's interpretation of Scott, 
which cited Burkoff, provides the possible missing link.186 Per-
haps the author of Villamonte-Marguez's footnote three, Justice 
Rehnquist, was familiar with LaFave's declaration that Scott 
was inconsistent with an individual motivation approach to pre-
text searches, although the footnote does not cite LaFave. As 
lower court opinions in other cases indicate, LaFave's interpreta-
tion of Scott has made respectable the claim that Scott spelled 
the end of an individual motivation approach to pretextual 
search problems.187 Like Professor Burkoff, I disagree that Scott 
required rejection of that approach. Accordingly, reference to 
Scott in Villamonte-Marquez makes me speculate that LaFave's 
reading of Scott has resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Examining the approaches of both Justice Rehnquist's major-. 
ity opinion and Brennan's dissent, we again find the hard-choice 
approach at work. The majority reexamined the power that the 
defendant claimed customs agents used pretextually. It noted 
the pretext possibility.188 It weighed the governmental interests 
against the individual's interests in being free from vessel docu-
181. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980), cited in 462 U.S. at 584 
n.3. 
182. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
183. 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. 
184. 436 U.S. at 135-43. 
185. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
186. LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 43-45. 
187. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983), invoked LaFave's interpreta-
tion of Scott in rejecting the pretext search approach endorsed by Professor Burkoff. 
Burkoff discusses this decision at length. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra 
note 6, at 540-44. 
188. 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. 
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mentation inspection in the absence of any requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion or any limitation upon the power of customs 
agents to board and inspect vessels under the broad circum-
stances outlined in the statute. The majority concluded that the 
statutory authority was reasonable.189 
In dissent, without pausing to refer to the claim of pretext, 
Justice Brennan argued for a narrowing of the statutory power 
that provided an opportunity for authorities to engage in pretex-
tual fourth amendment activity, just as he had voted to narrow 
the power of police to search incident to arrest in Abel.100 He 
viewed the power to make a document-inspection boarding of 
vessels as wrong in the absence of reasonable suspicion or some 
other check on discretion. He declared the power unreasonable 
not because customs agents could use the power as a pretext to 
catch suspected criminals but because it permitted what he 
viewed as too great an intrusion upon tens of thousands of sea-
going individuals, including those whom authorities did not sus-
pect of criminal activity.191 In using the hard-choice approach, 
Justice Brennan gave no hint that he would disallow only those 
boardings that were motivated by the agents' hopes that they 
would spot contraband in plain view. Thus, from Abel to Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, a span of twenty-three years, Justice Bren-
nan's opinions reflect the same consistency shown by the Su-
preme Court itself: rejection of the individual motivation 
approach in favor of reexamination of the power or doctrine 
that, the defense claims, law enforcement officials used 
pretextually. 
In the last analysis, of course, for purposes of academic discus-
sion, the most important thing is what the Supreme Court 
should do, not what it has done. I have provided extensive dis-
cussion of reported decisions because I think it important that 
we have an accurate chronicle of how the Supreme Court has 
reacted to claims of pretext. Like Professor Burkoff, I am a critic 
of many of the "Burger Court's" fourth amendment decisions.192 
I do not believe it fair, however, to blame the Burger Court for 
abandoning an approach which neither the Warren Court nor its 
predecessors had ever adopted. The fact that Justice Brennan 
189. Id. at 587-92. 
190. Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
191. Id. at 568-607 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
192. See generally, Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 6, 
where, as the title reflects, Burkoff claims that the Burger Court "devoured" the fourth 
amendment. For an example of my disagreement with some of that Court's fourth 
amendment decisions see infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
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has consistently avoided the individual motivation approach 
convinces me that the pretext problem is the type of fourth 
amendment issue most worth discussing: the kind where one's 
solution is not dictated by one's position on the liberal-conserva-
tive spectrum. Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court, in-
cluding both brilliant liberal and brilliant conservative Justices, 
has never adopted the individual motivation approach, although 
it has often had the opportunity, is persuasive authority that 
such a methodology does not provide the best answer to the 
pretextual fourth amendment activity question. 
V. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION APPROACH 
AND THE HARD-CHOICE APPROACH 
For several reasons, I am critical of Professor Burkoff's indi-
vidual motivation, case-by-case analysis of pretext search claims. 
The hard-choice test is easier to administer, requiring only a de-
termination of whether authorities operated within the letter of 
the law. The individual motivation methodology punishes the 
prosecution where an officer has acted within the letter of the 
law to further the laudable goal of obtaining incriminating evi-
dence. More importantly, an individual motivation methodology 
shifts the focus away from the most important issues: the exis-
tence and scope of fourth amendment limitations. Unlike the 
hard-choice approach, it tends to inhibit critical reassessment 
and deserved expansion of fourth amendment limitations. 
On the other hand, I believe that Professor Burkoff has made 
a valuable contribution to constitutional law analysis by demon-
strating the oversimplification in much of the criticism of the 
individual motivation approach. I join him in arguing that his 
critics' references to the difficulty of ascertaining motive should 
not preclude a search for motive in any particular constitutional 
law context. 
A. Motive and Constitutional Law Analysis: The Difficulty 
of Ascertaining Motive 
The typical criticism of Professor Burkoff's approach is quite 
unsophisticated. Ignoring the many areas of constitutional law 
analysis where the Court has assigned motive a role, or where 
the Court has denied it a role only after extensive discussion, the 
critics often dismiss, in a sentence or two, the individual-motiva-
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tion methodology of resolving pretextual fourth amendment ac-
tivity claims.193 Typically they emphasize the difficulty of ascer-
taining motive, borrowing a sentiment from Justice White's 
dissent in Painten: "[S]ending state and federal courts on an ex-
pedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave 
and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."19' But if consti-
tutional law sometimes makes motive determinative of out-
come-even in contexts where the search for motive is more dif-
ficult than in the pretextual search context-difficulty of 
ascertainment cannot suffice to defeat the use of motive in 
pretextual search analysis. 
1. The use of motive in other contexts- The decision to 
exclude evidence in a criminal case can sometimes depend upon 
what had been "in an officer's mind" or, more particularly, what 
his purpose or motive had been in engaging in certain conduct. 
For example, in cases where, after a defendant's right to counsel 
has attached, the police have obtained a statement in the ab-
sence of counsel and without a waiver, admissibility under Mas-
siah v. United States196 depends upon whether the police "de-
liberately elicited" the statement. Similarly, under 
Brown v. Illinois,196 one factor in determining the admissibility 
of a statement made by a suspect following his or her unlawful 
arrest is the "purpose" for which the officers made the arrest. 
Moreover, as Professor Burkoff has pointed out, dictum in Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Ceccolini197 sug-
gests that if a police officer violates the fourth amendment for 
the purpose of learning the identity of potential witnesses 
against a suspect, a court might have to exclude testimony of 
witnesses so discovered under circumstances where it would not 
have to exclude evidence if the officer violated the fourth 
amendment without such purpose. 
Thus, under each of these cases, Massiah, Brown, and Cec-
colini, admissibility might depend solely upon what had been 
"in the minds" of the officers. This holds true also in cases not 
strictly involving "motive." For example, the right to search in-
cident to arrest might depend upon whether the officer intends 
to· take a suspect into custody regardless of whether the search 
193. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 436-37. 
194. 389 U.S. at 565, quoted in LAFAVE Supp., supra note 1, § 1.2(g), at 46. 
195. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1982), may have 
supplemented this test but, even after Henry, deliberate elicitation suffices to trigger a 
sixth amendment violation. 
196. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
197. 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978). 
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of the suspect yields evidence. 198 The difficulty of determining 
the inner thoughts of a police officer has not prevented the law 
from assigning relevance to an officer's intent in such instances. 
By contrast, sometimes the Supreme Court, taking an "objec-
tive view," has deemed irrelevant what an officer actually had 
been thinking when he engaged in a challenged police practice. 
As Burkoff notes, under United States v. Robinson, 199 a safety 
rationale allows a search incident to a custodial arrest on a mi-
nor charge even if the particular officer had no fear for his 
safety. Similarly, the Court in New York v. Quarles200 recog-
nized a public safety exception to Miranda that does not require 
that the interrogating police officer believe that public safety re-
quires questioning a suspect without first providing Miranda 
warnings. 
Examining other areas of constitutional law, for example those 
involving equal protection challenges to legislative action, we 
would find numerous instances where the Court, after substan-
tial discussion, has deemed motive either relevant or irrelevant. 
Decisions like Palmer v. Thompson201 and Washington v. Da-
vis202 are among the better known. I find it especially interesting 
that some Justices on occasion condemn the use of motive in one 
context, because of difficulty of ascertainment, but those same 
Justices approve the use of motive as a standard for adjudica-
tion in a different context.203 We should examine, context-by-
context, whether sound reasons, including difficulty of ascertain-
ment, support rejection of the use of motive in shaping a rule of 
law. 
2. Difficulty of ascertaining motive in the pretext search 
context- As indicated above, some critics suggest that it would 
prove too difficult and time-consuming for a court, in applying 
pretext search doctrine, to determine why an officer operated 
under a particular fourth amendment doctrine. 20' Clearly the 
hard-choice approach is easier to administer. The issue under 
198. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text. 
199. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
200. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). 
201. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of municipal swimming pools allegedly to avoid 
integration). 
202. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (enacting statute allegedly for racial discriminatory 
purpose). 
203. Thus, in contexts not involving fourth amendment adjudication, Justices White 
and Rehnquist sometimes argue that motive should be relevant to constitutional adjudi-
cation. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 6, at 114 n.217. See also Hunter v. 
Underwood 105 S. Ct. 1916 (1985). 
204. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
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that test is only whether an officer acted within the letter of the 
law, not why the officer engaged in such conduct. '.fhe difficulty 
of administering an individual motivation approach, however, 
will vary depending upon the precise nature of the legal test. 
I agree with a thoughtful student commentator who has ar-
gued that a court would face an extraordinarily difficult task in 
determining, as is necessary for exclusion under Burkoff's ap-
proach, whether an officer acted solely for the wrong purpose.205 
Consider this hypothetical. The police have probable cause to 
arrest a suspect for aggravated battery. The victim, however, is a 
narcotics addict who may not appear for trial. Moreover, be-
cause the suspect has left the jurisdiction, bringing him to trial 
might require substantial expenditure of funds. Consequently, 
the officers bring no charge. Weeks later, they learn that the 
same suspect might have committed a triple homicide. Lacking 
probable cause for a murder arrest, officers obtain a warrant on 
the unrelated aggravated battery charge. They arrest him on 
that charge after he voluntarily returns to the jurisdiction. Im-
mediately thereafter they question him.about the homicides un-
til they obtain a confession. Prosecutors obtain murder convic-
tions and a death sentence, and then drop the aggravated 
battery charge, acknowledging that they made no real effort to 
locate the alleged battery victim. 206 
I cannot say that the officers' sole reason for making the ag-
gravated battery arrest was to question the suspect about unre-
lated homicides. Perhaps the officers felt that the suspect had 
committed three murders and should be prosecuted for some-
thing, even if they could not obtain sufficient evidence to charge 
him with murder. 
If the test instead asks whether the improper purpose-to 
question the suspect about unrelated homicides-was the pre-
dominant motivation for the aggravated battery arrest, I would 
more readily conclude that the facts demonstrated a pretextual 
arrest. I would find it still easier if, borrowing from Professor 
Brest's motivation test formulated for use in a different con-
text,207 the law required suppression if the improper motivation 
played a significant role in the officers' decisional process. 
205. Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motiva-
tion in Establishing Fourth Amendment Violation, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 257-63 (1983). 
206. The hypothetical parallels the facts in an Illinois case. See Appellant's Brief at 
37-40, People v. Hattery, No. 58789 (Ill. Nov. 21, 1985) (available Jan 6, 1986, on LEXIS, 
States library, Ill file). 
207. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motivation, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 130-31. 
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At any rate, under any standard, I believe that in some cir-
cumstances th~ evidence will demonstrate the requisite im-
proper motive. Sometimes the officer will admit his motivation. 
Other times circumstantial evidence will establish the improper 
motive. For example, a police officer might seek to justify stop-
ping a vehicle by truthfully testifying that the vehicle had been 
speeding. If he or she made the stop while responding to a rob-
bery in progress, however, the court can conclude that the of-
ficer's motive was not to enforce the traffic code. The officer ac-
ted with hope of gaining a vantage point to observe evidence of 
the robbery, even when the data that gave rise to the officer's 
suspicion did not provide adequate grounds for a Terry stop in 
connection with the robbery. 
The law could assign to the defense the burden of proving 
that a police officer acted with an improper purpose. If the de-
fense failed, the court would reject the suppression motion. With 
the burden thus allocated, the "difficulty of ascertainment" criti-
cism should not suffice to defeat an individual motivation ap-
proach to pretextual fourth amendment activities. The worst 
that one could say is that under such an approach, because of 
the difficulty of proof, the prosecution would sometimes benefit 
from evidence discovered through pretextual fourth amendment 
activity. Other reasons exist, however, for rejecting the individ-
ual motivation approach. 
B. Difficulty of Ascertaining the Rationale for Fourth 
Amendment Doctrines 
Up to this point, I have assumed that clearly defined purposes 
underlie all fourth amendment powers. With Professors Amster-
dam and Burkoff, I have defined a pretext search as one where 
the motives underlying a particular exercise of a power diverge 
from the rationale that courts have given to uphold the doctrine 
under which the police act. 208 The individual motivation solution 
requires that we identify a doctrine's proper rationale so that we 
can determine whether, on a particular occasion, the police acted 
under the doctrine for an improper purpose. 
This methodology proves troublesome because, unlike in the 
case of the inventory search,209 the Supreme Court has not al-
ways clearly defined the reasons that justify a particular doc-
208. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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trine. A majority of the Court might sustain a power without 
agreeing upon a rationale. Sometimes history plays a bigger role 
than logic.210 
Consider, for example, the whole constellation of searches 
classified as administrative. Presumably, one reason that the 
Court deems such searches reasonable-without traditional 
probable cause, and either without any warrant or pursuant to a 
warrant issued without traditional probable cause-is that they 
serve some legitimate governmental purpose besides the quest 
for evidence of a crime.211 But is the quest for such evidence also 
a proper purpose of an administrative search? The Supreme 
Court has never clearly spoken on this subject. Yet an individual 
motivation suppression doctrine requires an answer. Where of-
ficers have used an administrative search in quest of evidence, 
we must know whether this constitutes an improper purpose if 
we are to apply an individual motivation approach. Some confu-
sion in administrative search cases arises where defendants 
make pretext claims because of the assumption, perhaps errone-
ous, that the need to discover evidence of a crime is not a legiti-
mate rationale for an administrative search.212 Under the hard-
choice approach we need not face this issue. Even if a quest for 
evidence is not a proper rationale for an administrative search, 
the discovery of evidence often is a natural consequence of an 
administrative search conducted in accordance with the letter of 
the law.213 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
211. The cases reflect a tension about whether a "benign" purpose for a search is e 
factor in determining its reasonableness. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523 (1967) (fourth amendment protects against even "benign" searches), with Wyman v. 
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (indicates that a "benign" purpose is a factor in upholding 
the validity of a search). In this context, a search is "benign" if it serves some purpose 
other than to aid the investigation or prosecution of a crime. Yet the very existence of 
administrative search powers presumes that a fourth amendment power designed to 
serve some purpose other than the quest for evidence is to be judged under less stringent 
standards than a power designed to solve a crime or to aid a prosecution. 
212. I believe, for example, that Professor Burkoff's analysis of Villamonte-Marquez 
would have been different if he had acknowledged that vessel document inspection pow-
ers are designed to aid the detection of unlawful importation. See supra notes 172-174 
and accompanying text. I find similar confusion in the pretext claim made in Zap v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947), discussed in supra 
notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
213. Sometimes, for example, drug enforcement agents search pharmacies under an 
administrative warrant, that is, under a warrant issued without traditional probable 
cause to believe that criminal evidence is at the place to be searched. See, e.g., United 
States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1982). When their search proves successful, the 
agents' discovery almost always constitutes evidence of criminal activity. , 
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Consider another example. The police may take a suspect into 
custody upon probable cause. Is a legitimate reason for such a 
power the need to use the custodial detention for investigative 
purposes, even when authorities have not decided to go forward 
with a prosecution unless the investigation yields evidence of a 
crime? If the sole rationale for allowing the police to take a sus-
pect to the station house is for the purpose of initiating prosecu-
tion, then an officer acts pretextually if, uncommitted to prose-
cution, he or she takes a suspect into custody upon probable 
cause in order to obtain a confession or a lineup identification. 
To avoid this result, a court must conclude that one of the legiti-
mate reasons for police station custody is a quest for evidence. If 
so, is this "proper reason" for police station custody limited to a 
quest for evidence of the crime for which probable cause exists? 
Unless the latter limitation exists, police station custody on a 
disorderly conduct charge for the purpose of questioning a sus-
pect concerning a homicide charge turns out not to be pretextual 
under an individual motivation approach.214 
The functioning of the hard-choice approach does not depend 
upon a majority of the Court having agreed upon clearly defined 
and exclusive reasons legitimating a particular power. Once the 
Court has upheld a particular power, it does not matter what 
motivated the Court's decision as long as the police exercise that 
power within the letter of the law. The hard-choice approach 
does not depend upon a comparison of the "legitimate" reasons 
for a doctrine with the officers' true reasons for exercising that 
power. 
Thus the police can hold someone at a police station upon 
probable cause. The trial court can admit into evidence a lineup 
identification of someone so held without deciding whether the 
reasonableness of the power of the police to take a suspect into 
custody upon probable cause is supported, in part, by the gov-
ernmental need to use such custody as an investigative tool. 
C. Inhibition of the Development of the Law 
I strongly believe that the individual motivation approach to 
pretext searches inhibits proper reexamination and development 
214. I think such a result would shock most persons who support an individual moti-
vation approach to pretext problems. They would automatically classify as pretextual an 
arrest for offense A made for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime B. Those who 
would uphold such an arrest would do so by rejecting an individual motivation approach. 
See, e.g., People v. Dancy, 69 Ill. App. 3d 543, 387 N.E.2d 889 (1979). 
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of fourth amendment limitations and doctrines. As much of the 
preceding discussion indicates, the Supreme Court has had nu-
merous opportunities to use an individual motivation approach 
to check "abuses" of police powers. Instead it has properly reex-
amined the powers that, it is alleged, the police have used 
pretextually. 215 
Consider what the law might be like if the individual motiva-
tion approach had prevailed. We might live in a country where 
the police could search an entire home incident to a suspect's 
arrest unless a defendant could establish that the police officer 
was motivated by a quest for evidence.216 Without a warrant, of-
ficers could enter a suspect's home in non-emergencies, upon 
probable cause to arrest, even with only slight reason to believe 
the suspect was at home-unless a defendant could establish 
that a quest for evidence motivated the officers' entry into the 
home.217 
Consider another example, not treated above, of the effect 
upon fourth amendment law had the Court adopted an individ-
ual motivation approach. The Court might have allowed police 
officers to stop vehicles on the open highway within their unbri-
dled discretion unless a defendant could establish that the of-
ficers' true motive was not to enforce the motor vehicle code but 
rather to gain a vantage point for observing evidence of a crime 
more serious than one relating to vehicle licensing and registra-
tion laws. Fortunately, the Supreme Court protected all drivers, 
not just those suspected of criminal activity, by examining the 
license check power.218 It considered the possibility of pretextual 
uses as but one factor in its determination of reasonableness.218 
It made the hard but, I think, correct choice that the driver's 
privacy and liberty interests outweigh the governmental needs 
for such roving patrol license check stops. 
Of course, the Court could still reexamine various fourth 
amendment doctrines while simultaneously retaining an individ-
ual motivation approach. I believe, however, that the availability 
of an individual motivation approach serves as a "crutch." It al-
lows the Court to justify a particular police practice by declar-
ing, sometimes vaguely as in United States v. Robinson220 and 
215. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. 
218. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
219. Id. at 661. 
220. 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973). 
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in Abel v. United States,221 that the Court will deal with 
abuses of the power on a case-by-case basis. 
The more "outrageous" the pretextual use of a power, the 
more likely a defense lawyer will argue pretext and will fail to 
argue that a court should narrow the underlying power. Consider 
a dated warrant on a minor charge employed by police as a guise 
to enter a home in quest of evidence of a more serious crime. I 
join Professor Burkoff in believing that courts should not allow 
the police to use this tactic. 222 Defense lawyers invariably raise 
pretext claims when confronted by this practice. 223 'Sometimes 
they prevail. Sometimes they do not. Even in jurisdictions that 
embrace the individual motivation approach, the defense must 
establish that the predominant motivation was a quest for evi-
dence. (Under Burkoff's approach the defense would have the 
often impossible burden of demonstrating that the sole motive 
was the evidentiary quest.) 224 Undoubtedly, because defendants 
often will be unable to satisfy their burden of proof, the police 
will continue to abuse the entry-to-arrest power that flows from 
an arrest warrant where police possess probable cause to believe 
that the suspect is within the premises. 
The hard-choice approach, as explained before,2211 would de-
mand reexamination of the underlying doctrine or statute within 
which the police act. Today courts deem entries into a home, 
months or years after the warrant has issued, proper as long as 
the officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect is at 
home. I doubt if any change in this doctrine will occur as long as 
defendants advance solely a pretextual arrest analysis in those 
instances where the police, after a period of inactivity, have en-
tered a suspect's home, ostensibly to execute a dated arrest 
warrant. 
D. Protection Only for the Suspected Citizen 
By focusing attention upon abuse of a fourth amendment doc-
trine rather than upon the breadth of the doctrine itself, the in-
dividual motivation approach protects the suspected wrongdoer 
221. 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). 
222. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 538-44. 
223. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 314 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1975); State v. Hoven, 269 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1978). Cf. State 
v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983). 
224. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
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but not the ordinary citizen. It allows the police to direct their 
powers against the latter but not against the former. Contrary to 
Professor Burkoff's suggestion,226 this phenomenon is not the 
product of the bizarre imagination of Justice Rehnquist or the 
First Circuit judge whose 1980 opinion he cited in Villamonte-
M arquez. 227 It is the natural consequence of the individual moti-
vation approach, noted by Justice Brennan twenty-five years 
ago. , 
Consider how a defense counsel tries to establish an improper 
police motive in the absence of the officer's candid admission. 
Suppose, for example, that counsel theorizes that an officer 
stopped her speeding client not to enforce the traffic code but to 
investigate a recent robbery. The defense must offer evidence 
that the officer knew some facts that suggested that a traffic stop 
might yield evidence of a robbery. The more suspicious data the 
defense can show that the officer had, the more likely the de-
fense can establish that the true motive for the stop was unre-
lated to enforcement of the law against speeding. 
Picture, then, the officer who observes two speeding vehicles. 
Under the individual motivation approach, the officer can stop 
the ordinary speeder but not the speeder whom he also has rea-
son to suspect of more serious wrongdoing. As jurists from Bren-
nan to Rehnquist have observed, the result is exactly the oppo-
site of what society wishes. 228 We want officers to maximize their 
resources (including their activities within the fourth amend-
ment) in pursuit of serious offenders. 
If in the interest of privacy and liberty we wish to restrict the 
powers of the police, even when that inhibits law enforcement 
goals, we want those restrictions to benefit all of the citizenry, 
not just those especially suspected of criminal activity. Speaking 
personally, I disliked roving patrol stops under the license-check 
power. But my objections did not stem from the possibility that 
the police would make stops of motorists whom they had some 
slight reason to believe were transporting narcotics. Rather it 
was because the police could direct that power against any mo-
torist, including ones not in any way suspect. Similarly I dislike 
the inventory search power,229 not because police can "abuse" it 
to catch a criminal, but rather because I believe it unnecessarily 
opens to inspection the property of thousands of citizens not 
226. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 533. 
227. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. 
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suspected of wrongdoing. If I were to condemn the Terry230 
power to stop citizens upon reasonable suspicion, I would not 
speak from a fear that the police would use the power as a guise 
to clear the streets of narcotics. Rather I would argue that it 
gives the police the power to stop too many citizens when the 
officers have no particular reason to suspect narcotics dealing or 
use. Finally, if I could identify more closely with the nautical 
set, the result in Villamonte-Marquez might outrage me. Again I 
would direct my anger at the very existence of the power of gov-
ernment agents to interfere with the liberty and privacy of 
seagoers by boarding vessels without reasonable suspicion. As 
long as the power exists, I am not upset by the possibility that 
agents may exercise that power primarily in pursuit of narcotics 
investigations. 
E. Treating Law-Abiding Police as Wrongdoers 
Years ago I noted that my dissatisfaction with the individual 
motivation approach may have arisen from my uneasiness in ex-
plaining it to police officers while lecturing to them in fourth 
amendment training sessions. 231 As best I could, I would outline 
the prerequisites for a valid warrantless search under one or an-
other of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as 
those authorizing inventory searches or license check stops. But 
I would then warn the officers not to be too "cute" by using the 
particular exception for the wrong reason. The wrong reason, of 
course, was the quest for incriminating evidence. Eventually my 
schizophrenic exhortations began to echo in my ears like some 
mock Spenserian refrain: "Be wise, be wise, be wise. But be not 
too wise. "232 
I still believe that it is strange to instruct police officers that 
they act improperly even when, for the purpose of obtaining in-
criminating evidence, they act within the boundaries of a recog-
nized exception to the warrant requirement. If an ordinary citi-
zen acts within the boundaries of a statute to achieve ends not 
contemplated by statute, we do not criticize the citizen. We may 
congratulate the citizen for his or her creativity. Or, if we con-
sider the citizen's conduct to constitute an abuse, we demand 
that legislators rewrite the statute to eliminate the possibility of 
230. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
231. Haddad, supra note 7, at 214. 
232. Id. 
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abuse. 
I have outlined and defended my arguments against allowing 
motive to play a role in adjudications concerning pretext 
searches and arrests. Perhaps the weakest argument is the awk-
wardness in telling the police that certain searches and seizures 
are proper only up to the point where officers employ such pow-
ers in the hope of finding evidence of the crime for which they 
searched or seized the suspect. Nevertheless, I am not sure that 
I would have arrived at my present position if I had not exper-
ienced that awkwardness. 
F. Reacting to Criticism of the Hard-Choice Approach 
After courts have reexamined various fourth amendment rules 
under the hard-choice approach, eliminating some, narrowing 
some, and leaving some unmodified, possibilities for pretextual 
use will remain. Courts have eliminated roving patrol license 
check stops, for example. 233 They could limit the power to enter 
a suspect's home under the authority of a dated warrant. 234 But 
we know that they will not prevent the police from stopping 
speeding motorists. Because this is so, under the hard-choice ap-
proach the police will always have an opportunity to stop speed-
ing motorists in the hope of observing evidence of a robbery in 
plain view. The hard-choice approach says "so be it." 
My answer is implicit in what I have said before. If we can 
tolerate the power of the police to stop speeding motorists, then 
we should not be upset if the police use that power against a 
speeding motorist when motivated by the belief that the motor-
ist might also have committed a more serious criminal offense. 
More importantly, criticism of the hard-choice approach ig-
nores the big picture. Of course, under my approach some of-
ficers will "get away" with pretextual fourth amendment activity 
even where no doubt exists that they exercised a fourth amend-
ment power for the wrong reason. Yet, because of difficulty of 
proof, officers often will get away with pretext searches under 
Professor Burkoff's approach as well. The critical difference be-
tween our approaches is that, by demanding a reexamination of 
the underlying fourth amendment doctrines and focusing on the 
breadth rather than the potential for abuse of the doctrines, in 
the long run the hard-choice approach will greatly narrow the 
233. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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opportunity for pretextual use. It will also provide greater pro-
tection of fourth amendment interests for all the citizenry, not 
just for suspected wrongdoers. 
CONCLUSION 
If my tone in criticizing Professor Burkoff's individual motiva-
tion approach seems harsh in places, that should not mask my 
fundamental respect for his work and my gratitude for his rekin-
dling of my interest in the problems of pretextual fourth amend-
ment activity.· While I am firm in my belief that the United 
States Supreme Court has never acted in accordance with his 
views, I must acknowledge that hundreds of opinions from other 
courts agree with his basic approach. Professor Burkoff's articles 
have made me realize that to assert that even an improperly mo-
tivated officer acts within the boundaries of an established 
fourth amendment doctrine begs the question. The issue is 
whether courts should consider the police to have acted within 
the letter of the law if they had a certain motive. In Anglo-
American law, statutory compliance rarely turns upon an actor's 
motive. But as Professor Burkoff and I both have noted, some-
times in constitutional law adjudication, compliance with the 
Constitution does turn upon an actor's motive. 2311 The issue is 
whether motive should play a role in pretextual fourth amend-
ment analysis. The reader is left to decide whose position should 
be adopted. I understand that they will be assisted by Professor 
Burkoff's brief response to my remarks. 
235. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 

